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Taking Systemic Risk Seriously in Financial Regulation
M. T odd H enderson & J ames C. S pindler *

Bank regulation failed in the run up to the financial crisis o f2008, as it has numerous
times in the course o f U.S. history. This is despite the existence o f traditional pruden
tial regulation, such as capital adequacy mandates, reserve requirements, and bank
examination, as well as more common legal remedies, such as tort and contract
litigation. Unsurprisingly, in the wake o f these failures, many reforms have been
proposed, and some adopted, to try to reduce bank risk taking. These reforms include
limiting bank size, requiring bank managers to be paid differently, restricting invest
ment in high-risk financial products, and, o f course, tightening up existing prudential
regulation.
In this Article, we first categorize these proposals into traditional categories o f
regulation—ex ante and ex post forms—and point out the weaknesses o f each. Ex
post regulation— generally, liability after the fact fo r harm caused—fails almost by
construction: given externalities o f systemic risk and leverage, judgment-proofness
is virtually guaranteed and is uninsurable. Ex ante regulation— which comprises the
bulk o f current prudential relation— is, as a starting point, inefficient because itfails
to take into account both private information and subsequent public information.
More vexingly, ex ante regulation encourages worse behavior: size limits and
transactions taxes encourage higher-octane bets, and asset restrictions lead to the
recreation o f the same risk profiles in less efficient ways.
We then describe an intermediate form, what we call the “regulatory veto, ” which
allows regulators to intervene to reduce bank risk taking after banks have started
their activities, but before the losses have occurred. We show how the regulatory
veto is, potentially, an elegant solution to the information problem presented by ex
ante regulation and the judgment-proofness problem o f ex post regulation o f bank
activities. However, the regulatory veto is subject to a structural flaw: banks get to
move first in a form o f the ultimatum game and choose supra-optimal levels o f bank
activities, which are not quite bad enough to cause regulators to shut them down. To
mitigate this flaw, we propose reforms to enhance regulators’ ability to credibly
commit and to reduce banks ’ ability to game the system.
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Introduction
Modern American bank regulation is an array o f devices designed to limit risk at
individual banks and in the banking system as a whole. Allowing banks to take
deposits and other short-term liabilities in order to invest in loans and other long
term financial assets creates wealth, but private wealth-generating activities may not
be socially valuable if the costs they externalize onto others exceed the benefits.
Banking regulation, therefore, attempts to attain the socially optimal level o f banking
activity by limiting the activity o f banks.1 Departures from the optimum hurt society:
too little lending lowers bank profits and reduces the economy’s access to credit,
while too much lending and investment creates excessive risks that will largely, in
the event o f catastrophic failure, be borne by someone else.
The regulatory tool kit o f bank regulation is diverse and includes both what we
term ex ante and ex post forms o f regulation. Consider first ex ante bank regulation
(often referred to as “prudential” bank regulation).2 Entry into the banking business
is regulated by state and federal agencies. The kinds o f activities banks can engage
in— the “business o f banking” and activities “necessary” to this business— are lim
ited.3 “Safety and soundness” rules4 limit the types and sizes o f loans, restrict lending
and other dealings to and with bank executives, mandate amounts o f cash that must
be held in reserve,5 and prescribe limits on the amount o f leverage that banks may

1. For welfarists, this is the purpose of regulation of any activity. As discussed below,
the case for active and aggressive regulation is stronger in the banking context than in other
areas. While it might make sense to let our regulation of most consumer goods be handled
through voluntary market transactions and an ex post remedy for fraud or other harm, this
approach is unlikely to work for banking.
2. See About the OCC, O ffice of the Comptroller of the C urrency, https://www
.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html |https://perma.cc/SGE2-H77X].
3. E.g., The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (2012).
4. See, e.g., O ffice of the C omptroller of the C urrency, U.S. Dep ’t of T reasury,
Bank Supervision Process: Comptroller’s H andbook (2007) (describing the seven
categories of safety and soundness regulation).

5. Various state and federal regulators, such as the Department of Treasury or the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, prescribe reserve requirements—cash on hand banks must
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take.6 D isclosure obligations under Basel Pillar 3 m andate disclosure to enable “m ar
ket discipline” o f banks.7 Federal deposit insurance m andates that banks pay prem i
ums to insure dem and deposits against deficiencies.8 Finally, various governm ent
agencies have broad statutory pow er to seek injunctive relief and dam ages in the
event o f losses caused by banking.9 So far, banking regulation looks a lot like other
areas o f regulation, albeit far stricter and m ore com prehensive.
Ex post m easures generally involve m opping up after the dam age has been done.
Jilted creditors and counterparties may pursue their rem edies in court, as m ay the
governm ent, particularly in the case o f a federal payout. Banks that fail are forced
into receivership, their assets unw ound, and creditors paid o ff to the extent p o ssib le.10
Finally, bank personnel w ho have com m itted w rongdoing m ay be sued or
prosecuted.
In addition, there is a rather unique banking regulatory institution th at spans ex
post and ex ante m easures. Specialized regulators, know n as “ exam iners,” are as
signed to individual b a n k s." Exam iners have an additional, and unusual, m andate:

maintain to repay depositors and creditors. For example, the Federal Reserve Board’s
Regulation D prescribes reserve requirements beyond those required by law. Reserve Require
ments, FederalReserve.gov, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm
[https://perma.ee/4JJ8-XTK6] (last updated Oct. 27, 2016). For example, the Gam-St.
Germain Act exempts the first $2 million from reserve obligations, and the first $25 million
above this is subject to a relatively low (i.e. 3 percent) reserve requirement by the Monetary
Control Act of 1980. Id. Regulation D sets the reserve requirement above $115.1 million at 10
percent. Id.
6. Specifically, capital adequacy requirements, primarily under the Basel Accords, limit
the bank’s ability to engage in risky activities that generate obligations the bank may be unable
to repay. For a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s implementation of the Basel Accords, see
generally Risk-based Capital Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,982 (June 26, 2008), (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 225).
7. See B asel Comm . O n Banking Supervision, Bank for Int ’l Settlements,
Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements (2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d309.pdf
| https://perma.cc/H4GW-F4EK], For an example o f Pillar 3 disclosure, see, e.g., Bank o f Am.,
Pillar 3 Disclosures, Investor Relations, http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml
?c=71595&p=iro!-bascl#fbid=5xLoxBRdnYn [https://perma.ee/F5VH-LQWN].
8. See 12 U.S.C. tj 1811 (2012) (including regulations promulgated thereunder);
Understanding
Deposit
Insurance,
FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/
[https://perma.ee/P6S5-FBUN] (last updated Jan. 5, 2017).
9. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 198 (2012) (giving receivers appointed by the Comptroller o f
the Currency powers to buy bank assets).
10. See, e.g., Receivership Management Program, FDIC (May 19, 2015), https://www
.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/receivership.html [https://perma.ee/FU4T-6C2H],
11. According to the Washington Mutual (WaMu) failure report, “FDIC assigns a dedi
cated examiner to the largest insured financial institutions. The dedicated examiner serves as
the case manager for these institutions and works in cooperation with primary supervisors and
bank personnel to obtain real-time access to information about an institution’s risk and trends.”
D ep ’t . of T reasury, O ffices of Inspector G en., E valuation of Federal Regulatory
O versight of W ashington Mutual Bank 69 (2010) [hereinafter Wa M u Report], T o as
sess risk at a broader level, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) conducts a wide
range of activities to monitor and assess risk from a regional and national perspective. At the
institutional level, FDIC monitors large non-FDIC supervised institutions primarily through
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to assess the riskiness o f a ban k ’s entire bank portfolio o f activities and to shut down
the w hole bank or specific bank activities if the expected costs and harm s o f the
activities are excessive.12 In theory, bank exam iners ought to be able to zero in on the
activity sw eet spot at w hich social w elfare is m axim ized. W hile the nature and scope
o f exam inations differ, for large, com plex banks, the exam ination team is a constant
regulatory p resence.1' Regulators have vast pow ers to curtail bank activities, to re
quire increased m onitoring o f activities, to require the bank to raise m ore capital, to
im pose new operating procedures, to replace m anagem ent, and even to shut down
specific activities or the entire b an k .14
N otw ithstanding the panoply o f regulatory m easures available, this regulatory
system utterly failed in the run up to the financial crisis o f 2008, as m any banks and
financial firm s collapsed or had to be bailed o u t as the result o f too m uch exposure
to residential real estate, especially derivative instrum ents linked to subprim e lo an s.15
This was not the first tim e the system failed to keep bank activities in check. During
the Savings and Loan (S& L) Crisis o f the late 1980s, certain types o f banks, know n
as thrifts, engaged in far too much lending to particular borrow ers, resulting in w ide
spread bank failu res.16 In ju st the tw o m ost recent crises, the estim ated direct losses
in the trillions o f d o llars.17 T he indirect costs and broader social costs are probably

its Dedicated Examiner and Case Manager programs. FDIC relies on the Primary Federal
Regulator’s (PFR) examinations to determine a bank's overall condition and the risks posed
to the Deposit Insurance Fund. Additionally, FDIC, by statute, has special examination author
ity and certain enforcement authority for all insured depository institutions for which it is not
the PFR. Id. at 67.
12. The “safety and soundness” rules, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, require
evaluation of attributes such as asset quality, risk governance, liquidity, and earnings.
13. For a detailed discussion o f the supervision process, see generally M. Todd Henderson
& Frederick Tung, Pay fo r Regulator Performance, 85 S. C al. L. Rev . 1003 (2012); 1 Fed .
Deposit Ins . C orp., A n Examination of the Banking C rises of the 1980s and Early
1990s 421 (1997) |hereinafter FDIC Report], https://www.fdic.gov/bankyhistorical/history
/voll.html |htlps://perma.cc/F8ZS-2Z4W|. For instance, during the period leading up to
WaMu’s failure, federal bank examiners spent over 160,000 hours (about 27,000 per year on
average) working exclusively on supervision o f WaMu. WaM u Report, supra note 11, at 17,
Table 5. Examinations averaged about 150 days in length and were conducted by the
equivalent of twenty full-time employees. Id. at 16-17, Tables 5, 6.
14. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1019-21.
15. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is
Inevitable,
Forbes
(Jan.
8,
2013,
6:26
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevedenning/2013/01/08/five-years-afier-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big
-sharks/ [https://perma.cc/7SQH-UZYY].
16. For an account of the S&L Crisis, see generally James R. Barth, T he G reat Savings
and Loan Debacle (1991).
17. For an estimate of the costs of the S&L Crisis, see generally Timothy Curry & Lynn
Shibut, The Cost o f the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING
R ev., no. 2, 2000, at 26, 33. For an estimate of the direct fiscal costs o f the current financial
crisis, see generally David Luttrell, Tyler Atkinson & Harvey Rosenblum, Fed. Reserve Bank
o f Dali., Assessing the Costs and Consequences o f the 2007-09 Financial Crisis and Its
Aftermath, 8 Econ. L etter, no. 7, 2013, http://www.dallasfed.org/research/cclett/2013
/el 1307.cfm | https://perma.cc/EL3L-DVU4].
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many times this am ount.18 Banking crises appear to be a recurring phenomenon;
historically, the United States has experienced one about every twenty or thirty
19
years.
In response to the most recent bank failures, new systems of bank regulation have
been proposed and, to some extent, implemented. New rules require banks to claw
back from executives erroneously earned pay, based on a negligence standard.20 Fed
eral Reserve guidance effectively mandates restricted periods for performance-based
compensation.21 The so-called Volcker Rule, as currently proposed, would restrict
the ability o f banks to engage in proprietary trading deemed too risky.22 Several
prominent academic commentators propose mandating inside debt compensation for
managers.2’ Others propose regulators be empowered with the authority to prescreen
bank activities to see whether they will improve social welfare.24 While apparently
now discarded, there was a serious push for a tax on financial transactions25 and a

18. Luttrcll et al., supra note 17, at 2.
19. There were large banking crises in (at least) 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1890,
1893, 1907, 1933, the late 1980s, and the late 2000s. For a more general treatment of banking
crises, see generally C armen M. Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, T his T ime Is Different:
Eight C enturies of F inancial Folly (2009).
20. See 12 C.F.R. § 380.7 (2016).

21. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227 (proposed
Oct. 27, 2009) (specifically stating the Federal Reserve’s “expectation” that banks will utilize
long-term compensation methods, including deferral); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re
form and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956, 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010)
(codified at I2U.S.C. §5641 (2012)). Congress requires that the appropriate federal regulators
shall jointly prescribe regulations or guidelines that prohibit any type of incentive-based pay
ment arrangement, or any feature of any such arrangement, that the regulators determine
encourages inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions: (1) by providing an executive
officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered financial institution with
excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to
the covered financial institution).
22. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620 (codified al 12 U.S.C. § 1851). The Act defines “proprietary
trading” as “engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity or nonbank
financial company supervised by the Board in any transaction to purchase” or sale of securities
or commodities. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1630.
23. See, e.g., Frederick l ung, Pay for Ranker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensationfor Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev . 1205, 1226-27(2011) (proposing bank
executive compensation contracts include securities tied to a bank’s subordinated debt securi
ties, since the price of these securities is tied to the downside risk of the bank and therefore
will give bank executives incentives to reduce risk taking to socially optimal levels).
24. See, e.g, Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Wey I, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying
the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 Nw. U. L.
Rf.v. 1307 (2013) (arguing for an FDA-like administrative agency to preapprove new financial
instruments before they are offered to the public or used by banks or other nonbank financial
institutions).
25. In 2009, various proposals were introduced in the House to tax securities transactions.
For instance. Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Sen. Tom Flarkin (D-lowa) proposed a tax of
twenty-five basis points on securities transactions. David Rogers, Pelosi Pushes Global Finan
cial Fee, Politico, (Dec. 3, 2009, 9:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209
/30200.html [https://perma.cc/U5Xl 1-N47L].
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lim itation on the size o f banks.26
We are not optim istic that any o f this regulation will prevent another banking
crisis and believe som e o f these reform s may actually increase risk in the banking
sector. W e m ake our argum ent as follow s. First, w e describe how current and pro
posed banking rules fit into fam iliar categories o f regulation in other areas— that is,
ex ante and ex post regulation— and consider the general costs and benefits o f these
approaches. W e also identify a third type o f regulation, the ex am in er’s on-site
evaluation o f bank risk, w hich w e call the “regulatory veto.” W hile in other areas o f
econom ic activity w e generally rely either on ex ante regulatory approval (e.g., drugs
approved by the FDA or rules prescribed by the EPA) or ex post litigation (e.g.,
products liability law), in banking there is significant regulatory pow er that lies b e
tw een these tw o poles. T his is an underappreciated, but core, function o f banking
regulation.
Second, w e consider ex ante and ex post regulation in banking, and find that they
are either incapable o f containing system ic risk and preventing future financial crises
or unlikely to strike the optim al balance betw een regulation and w ealth creation. The
failure to contain risk arises from the “gam eability” o f ex ante regulation, as banks
and bank shareholders can often assem ble the sam e overall risk/rew ard profiles via
alternative m eans. T he rapid pace o f financial innovation and the inability o f regula
tors to anticipate ahead o f tim e all undesirable activities and activity levels m eans
that law m akers are often plugging one o f m any holes in the dyke, to little positive
effect.27
To the extent that ex ante regulation does constrain behavior, w e argue that it is
unlikely to be particularly helpful. T he reason is that regulatory prescreening fails to
capture inform ation about the social value and cost o f bank activities. Ex ante regula
tions, if they w ork, do not allow parties to act fully upon their private inform ation.
For instance, a one-size-fits-all approach to bank size will necessarily be overinclusive (lim iting good banks from socially beneficial activities above the portfolio
lim its) and underinclusive (allow ing bad banks to engage in socially undesirable
activities up to the portfolio lim its). This lack o f inform ation (about both costs and
benefits) plagues existing proposals to regulate bank activities directly, such as pro
posals for sm aller banks, lim its on am ounts and types o f executive com pensation,
and insurance requirem ents, in the form o f capital cushions. Further, the reg u lato r’s
inform ation m ay im prove over tim e, a benefit w hich is lost w hen both banks and the
regulator are constrained by ex ante edicts.
Finally, ex ante regulation is plagued by public choice problem s. T he dynam ics
o f congressional lobbying and the regulatory agency revolving door likely favor
established institutions and tend to retard both new entry and econom ic grow th.

26. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An ErsatzAntitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 Yale L.J. 1368, 1371 (2011) (proposing to
limit any financial institution from amassing “liabilities in an amount greater than 5%” than
the FDIC insurance fund for deposits).
27. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta’s 2007 Financial Markets Conference (May 15, 2007) (stating that “regulators
should resist the temptation to devise ad hoc rules for each new type o f financial instrument
or institution,” and that “[d]evising an appropriate regulatory response to financial innovation
is challenging”).
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Politically pow erful banks, rather than com petent ones, may be able to win con ces
sions from regulators. O ther industries, such as securities underw riting and
com m odities trading, may seek to lim it com petition by prohibiting bank entry into
those areas.28
Ex post regulation is no panacea either. W hile legal action is available to both
private parties and the governm ent to seek com pensation for losses caused by harm 
ful banking practices, these suits are unlikely to be effective deterrents. As a practical
m atter, such suits are extrem ely rare. In term s o f governm ent suits, this could be
because o f the political influence large banks have alw ays had since the governm ent
relies on them to create w ealth.2'* In term s o f private suits, this may have to do with
the com plexity o f the cases, the expected litigation costs o f m aking a suit, and the
difficulty o f proving a breach o f a duty in this setting.30 But the larger failing o f ex
post regulation is judgm ent proofness. W here potential losses are very large, as they
are for a banking crisis, m ost defendants are likely to be bankrupt and unable to pay
any liability assessed. M andatory insurance, often used in other industries, is a ty p i
cal w ay to m itigate the judgm ent-proofness problem , but this m ay be ineffective in
the case o f bank failures because o f the system ic nature o f the financial system : the
entire industry may fail together— sw am ping the resources o f any m andatory insur
ance system .
In any event, so long as banks face expected losses from w rongful activities that
are low er than the externalized costs, banks will engage in too much banking activity
and take on too m uch risk. In short, there is som e value to regulatory delay because
the quantity and quality o f inform ation held by regulators, and thus the quality o f
regulatory decisions, is increasing in tim e, but w aiting too long is dangerous because
the risk o f judgm ent proofness is also increasing in tim e.
Third, w e point out an unusual feature o f banking regulation, w hich we believe is
designed to am eliorate the problem s caused o f both ex ante and ex post regulation
by taking an interm ediate position. This is the institution o f the bank exam iner, who
is authorized to veto or shut dow n a bank’s operations based on an assessm ent o f the

28. By way o f example in the realm o f financial regulation, it has been argued that the
Securities Act of 1933 served to “reduce competition among investment banks.” Paul
Mahoney, The Political Economy o f the Securities Act o f 1933. 30 J. L egal Stud . 1, 1 (2001).
29. The decision to not prosecute Goldman Sachs for its role in the financial crisis was
decried by some commentators as an example o f cronyism between large Wall Street financial
institutions and regulators, occasioned by the revolving door between regulated firms and
government. E.g., Peter Schweizer, Why Goldman Sachs, Other Wall Street Titans Are Not
Being Prosecuted, T he Daily Beast (Aug. 14, 2012, 04:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeasLcom
/artieles/2012/08/l4/why-goldman-sachs-other-wall-street-tilans-are-not-being-proseculed.html
[https://perma.cc/GW9H-ZHC8l.
30. The barriers for civil suits by government and private parties are substantial. Banks
may not owe a fiduciary duty to their clients, and contracts between the bank and its customers
are filled with disclaimers that limit the bank's liability. E.g.. Peter .1. Henning, Is That It fo r
Financial Crisis Cases?, N.Y. T imes: D eai.Book (Aug. 13, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2012/08/l3/is-that-il-for-financial-crisis-cases/?_php=truc& lype=blogs&_r=0
[https://perma.ee/C6L6-MP79], Plaintiffs also have to show scienter, which can be extremely
difficult in these cases. See id.; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976). This
is especially the case when both parties are sophisticated entities, as was the case in most of
the allegedly fraudulent transactions leading up to the financial crisis. See Henning, supra.
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bank’s type and amount o f activities on an ongoing basis.11 We call this feature a
regulatory veto since it is a determination about whether existing activities should
and can continue, made after they have commenced but before they have completed.
The regulatory veto is intended to strike a balance between ex ante and ex post
regulation, trying to avoid the informational problems o f the former and the it’s-toolate problem o f the latter.12 For instance, it appears that examiners at Washington
Mutual (WaMu) successfully identified excessive risk concentrations in some asset
classes.” Forcing an unwinding o f some o f these positions could, in theory, have at
least limited the magnitude o f W aM u’s failure and its effect on the wider banking
system.
Finally, despite the advantages o f this intermediate approach, we describe a
fundamental flaw o f the regulatory veto and point to this as a major source o f the
inefficient regulation o f banks. While existing regulatory reforms focus on bad deci
sions or incentives o f bankers, we argue that it is actually a game-theoretic problem
that keeps the regulatory veto from functioning correctly: the veto game between the
bank and the regulator is an ultimatum game in which the bank moves first. As we
show below, since the bank gets to decide the activity before the examiner can veto
it, the bank effectively presents the regulator with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. So long
as overall social welfare is not sufficiently negative, the regulator will weakly prefer
not to shut down an overly risky activity, since firm production yields a net societal
benefit o f zero and the costs o f shutdown are positive and significant. The result is
socially inefficient and excessive amounts o f bank activity— not as high as without
the regulatory veto, but still potentially far above the social optimum.
Thus, the regulatory veto model is a vital yet flawed component o f banking
regulation. Therefore, our prescription for bank regulation reform is to try to improve
the dynamics o f the bank-regulator game, so that making take-it-or-leave-it offers
will be more costly for banks. Social welfare outcomes (though not firm profits)
could be improved by giving the regulator an arsenal o f credible threats to veto bank
activity; threats may be made credible by altering regulator incentives14 or enlarging
the regulator’s permissible action set. Ex ante regulations that limit the costs o f bank
shutdown (such as so-called living wills) make the regulatory veto more efficient.
We outline those areas we think most ripe for improvement.

31. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(2012).
32. For instance, if a bank decides to engage in lending concentrated in a particular indus
try or geography, the regulator could decide that the social risks arc too high and therefore
demand the bank shut down the particular lending or the entire bank. The veto is exercised
after a decision about whether to engage in the activity has been made by bankers and after
regulators can observe the social cost of those activities. A more efficient allocation of re
sources is possible because shareholders can act on their signal of prospective firm value, and
because regulators can act based on an ex post signal of firm value and riskiness.
33. Wa Mu Report, supra note 11, at 15.
34. Henderson & l ung, supra note 13, at 1008-09 (proposing to compensate bank regula
tors with securities mimicking the stock price and debt price of the banks they supervise in
order to give the regulators upside and downside incentives from bank performance).
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I. T he B a n k in g S y s t e m : A P rim er

This section lays the groundwork for the normative analysis in Part III. We first
discuss the generally accepted economic model of bank wealth creation, in which
banks turn short-term liabilities (such as bank deposits) into long-term assets (such
as mortgage loans). The mismatch between the maturities of liabilities and assets
carries with it particular vulnerabilities that, given the importance of banking to the
economy, may make some regulation desirable. We also describe how this model
and the rationale for regulation extends to nonbank financial institutions that perform
some traditional banking functions.
Next, we describe the current system of banking regulation. In our taxonomy,
banking regulation is divisible into ex post and ex ante measures. Ex ante measures
are those in which regulators require or prohibit certain bank activities (or levels of
activity) before banks have undertaken any activity. Ex post describes the case where
the regulator or legal system waits until after the banking activity has occurred and
any harm has been realized before seeking remedies (or imposing punishments)
against the bank and its managers. One form of bank regulation, that of the bank
examiner and the regulatory veto, finds a middle ground between ex ante and ex post
regulation.
Finally, we describe banking reform proposals that have surfaced in recent years.
These proposals include bank size limits, a financial transactions tax, a financial
FDA, and greater penalties on bank managers. We classify these reforms into our ex
ante/ex post taxonomy. The ex ante/ex post classification aids our economic analysis
of banking regulation, which we undertake in Part II.
A. Banking Basics— Long-short Mismatch, Runs, and Maintaining Confidence
The effective and efficient regulation of banks is crucial to a well-functioning
economy. Banks perform the crucial role of intermediating short- and long-term
financial investments— in effect creating the credit necessary for both businesses and
households to function. This role, in addition to other ancillary functions of banks
(such as operating payment systems and trading in securities), makes banks systemically important in that the failure of many (or even one very large) banks is generally
thought to have significant economic consequences beyond just the bank’s security
holders and counterparties.
A problem with banks, though, is that the very feature that allows them to create
value also makes them vulnerable to insolvency due to a decrease in asset values— or
even for no reason at all. Following the famous Diamond & Dybvig model of bank
ing, the central business model of banks (and so-called shadow banks, which are
financial firms that undertake the same sort of strategy) is that banks borrow on short
term maturities at a low interest rate, lend at long-term maturities at a high interest
rate, and pocket the difference in interest rates on the two. ’3 Figure 1, below, depicts

35. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 9 1 .1. Pol. Econ . 401 (1983) (providing a model o f banking stability given asset and
liability mismateh and o f bank runs and financial crisis in which even solvent banks are fragile
under the stability model); see also Frederic S. Mishkin & Stanley G. Eakins, F inancial
Markets and Institutions 403 (7th ed. 2012).
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a bank that takes various forms of primarily short-term liabilities (such as deposits
and repurchase agreements) and converts them primarily into long-term assets (such
as mortgages and term loans to businesses); revenues from the assets are used to pay
interest and principal on the short-term liabilities.

Mortgages
Short-term
liabilities (repos,
interbank
lending, trading
positions

long-term

debt
Short-term
lending

Figure

I.

Shareholder
j equity

Funding and Activities of a Typical Bank

Consider a simple bank that makes loans funded by the accounts of depositors.
The prototypical bank deposit is a “demand” deposit, meaning that the depositor has
the right to withdraw her money whenever she desires; this is the shortest possible
maturity of borrowing, in that it is due and payable at any time upon the demand of
the depositor.'6 Depositors like such flexibility, as they may suddenly need their
money to cover unanticipated expenses, such as medical bills or other unforeseen
liabilities. Nevertheless, despite the promise to repay the depositor on demand, the
bank is able to turn this deposit into long-term money that it can lend to other
individuals or businesses. So if the depositor deposits $ 100 in the bank, the bank may
turn around and immediately lend out this $100 to a business or homebuyer for a
much longer term (the typical mortgage, for instance, has a 30-year maturity). In this
way, the liquidity needs of the depositor and the long-term capital needs o f the bor
rower can be met; the bank has effectively turned the depositor’s $ 100 of short-term
cash into $ 100 of long-term assets. In the language of macroeconomics, the bank has
increased the supply of money by $100, from $100 to $200, allowing additional
investment and growth in the economy. ’7
What happens, however, when the depositor wants her money back? In the above
example, the bank would be unable to call in its loan to the borrower since it is not

36. For a discussion of various funding types, including demand deposits, see Div. of
C onsumer & C mty. A ffairs, T he Fed . Reserve S ys., Regulation D: Reserve Requirements,
in C onsumer Compliance H andbook (2010).
37. See N. G regory Mankiw , Principles of Economics 630 (6th ed. 2012).
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yet due, and the bank would therefore be unable to pay its liabilities as they come
due— the bank is insolvent, in other words. There are two things that banks do in
tandem to avoid such an outcome. Banks, first of all, diversify across depositors, and
second, they do not lend out all of the money that depositors deposit. This amount
that banks hold, rather than lend, is known as reserves. The more diversified the
depositor base, the lower the reserves that a bank must hold, and the more credit it
can extend to borrowers. This leads to the system of “fractional reserve banking,” as
it is known, in which banks must hold only a fraction of their deposits as reserves. 18
Notably, this prudential measure arises even without the existence of government
regulation. No bank that lent out too much of its deposits would stay in business long.
But, notwithstanding banks’ incentives to remain solvent, national and international
laws regulate the amount of cash banks must hold on hand and limit the amount of
leverage banks can take, as described below.
Apart from diversifying depositor accounts, banks maximize the amount that they
can safely lend by using experience and sophisticated models to predict withdrawals,
thereby saving a bare minimum to meet demand deposit requests. Additionally, if
banks find themselves with too few reserves, banks can typically borrow reserves
from another entity (such as other banks, financial firms, and even the government),
sell assets, raise more deposits, or issue securities. A problem with these stopgap
measures is that they may not work in a systemic crisis: other institutions may be
unwilling to lend; asset prices may have already declined, with further sales increas
ing the downward price pressure; depositors (or other lenders) may fear losing their
investments; and shareholders would be unwilling to commit more capital if the
bank’s assets are less than its non-equity liabilities.
But low reserves make banks more susceptible to a bank run. A run happens when
depositors lose confidence their money is available or will be available in the future,
causing them to demand their money back immediately. As viewers of H ’s a Wonder
ful Life or Mary Poppins know, a bank run could wipe out a solvent bank that does
not have the instantaneous ability to convert its illiquid assets to cash. In a sort of
self-fulfilling prophecy, if one depositor believes that other depositors are likely to
demand their deposits back, then it makes sense for her to demand as well, since
otherwise, if the reserves are inadequate, she will, at best, not immediately have ac
cess to her account, and, at worst, lose some or all of her investment. Thus, in what
is wholly a rational panic, 39 all depositors may demand their deposits back at the
same time, even though no fundamental change has occurred at the bank.
While rational panics and bank runs may occur for no substantive reason at all,
deficiencies in a bank’s capitalization make bank panics and bank failure more likely.
Certainly, the amount of reserves on hand is one such important variable: as the
likelihood of being unable to meet withdrawal needs increases, depositors and other
creditors will be less willing to keep their money with the bank. Similarly, as the
value of a bank’s assets (its mortgages and loans) declines, due to, say, a deterioration

38. See M ishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 4 0 1.
39. In the Diamond and Dybvig model, a bank’s “demand deposit contract providing
[liquidity transformation] has an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run) in which all depositors
panic and withdraw immediately, including even those who would prefer to leave their depos
its in if they were not concerned about the bank failing.” Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 35,
at 402.
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in the real estate market, the likelihood of substantive insolvency increases as well.
Conversely, as new equity is injected into the bank, creating a cushion for depositors
and other creditors, the likelihood of substantive insolvency lessens and bank runs
become less likely.
The solution, developed in response to the banking crisis that triggered the Great
Depression, is government insurance.40 To reduce the fear of a bank run, and thus to
decrease the cash necessary to be held on hand (and therefore to increase the speed
at which wealth can be created), the government stands behind bank deposits,
promising to pay if the bank does not.41 The primary mechanism is guarantees of
deposits up to $250,000 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which
charges member banks a risk-adjusted premium.42 The FDIC acts on the assumption
that if depositors know that they have assurances from the government, they have no
need to pull out their money.4’
Yet the solution to bank runs creates another problem. Let the depositors know
their deposits are secure, and they will care little about the prudence of their bank’s
lending operations. The government guarantee satisfies their worries about non
payment, no matter how badly the bank performs.44 This is the familiar moral hazard
problem, and it inevitably leads to a less-than-optimal amount of private monitoring
of bank risk taking. It therefore falls on the government, as it falls on every guarantor,
to take steps to monitor the bank so that it does not engage in risky activities that
could trigger claims against it under the guarantee. Out of the government’s need to
control moral hazard by its banks, the system of bank regulation has been born.
Banks are also dependent on nondeposit funding. Banks may borrow from other
banks and financial institutions, establish trading positions that may incur liabilities
in the near future, issue longer term certificates of deposits, sell bonds, and undertake
new stock offerings. These stakeholders do not benefit from FDIC insurance— in
fact, because the government gives priority to FDIC-insured accounts when winding
up banks,45 one could say that they lose from it—and hence their incentives to pull

40. See M ishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 456.
41. These concerns are not present, or are present to a much lesser degree, in a world in
which banks issue bank-specific notes o f general circulation. For a discussion of a banking
system comprised of private money, see generally Bruce D. Smith & Warren E. Weber, Private
Money Creation and the Suffolk Banking System, 31 J. Money, C redit & Banking 624 (1999).
42. The Deposit Insurance Fund, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/dcposit/insurance/index
.html | https://perma.cc/K7WU-3PEQI (last updated Nov. 29, 2016); Deposit Insurance FAQs,
FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit%2Fdeposits/faq.hlml [https://perma.ee/9VUD-U7A8]
(last updated June 3, 2014).
43. See, e.g., D iane Ellis, Fed . Deposit Ins. Corp ., Deposit Insurance Funding:
A ssuring Confidence (2013).
44. Current rules limit the amount o f deposit insurance to $250,000, hut individuals can
evade this limit by holding accounts of up to this amount in multiple banks, each o f which is
insured for the maximum amount See Deposit Insurance FAQs, supra note 42 (“The FDIC
covers the traditional types of bank deposit accounts— including checking and savings ac
counts, money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), and certificates of deposit (C D s).. . . The
standard deposit insurance amount is $250,000 per depositor, per FDIC-insured bank, per
ownership category.”).
45. See When a Bank Fails - Facts fo r Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, FDIC
(Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/priority.html [https://perma.ee
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credit from a troubled bank remain strong. In a slower-moving analog o f a bank
panic, these sorts o f various bank stakeholders may refuse to invest new funds, and
further, may refuse to roll over (that is, renew) old debts as they come due. Lehman
Brothers, for instance, found itself unable to roll over its short-term liabilities, largely
securities repurchase agreements (repos), even though Lehman remained balancesheet solvent.46
Thus, the problem o f bank runs poses a problem not just for actual banks, but for
the variety o f financial firms that undertake bank-like activities, so-called shadow
banks.47 Shadow banks are dependent upon short-term liabilities to fund long-term
assets and therefore face the very same vulnerabilities as do actual banks. Money
market funds, some hedge funds, structured investment vehicles, and some invest
ment banks (such as Lehman) borrow in short-term credit markets to purchase
longer-term assets. Some of these shadow banks, such as Lehman and Reserve
Primary Fund (the oldest money market mutual fund), did experience failures that
were as potentially damaging to the financial system as were the actual bank failures
that occurred.48
Given the fragility o f the banking and shadow banking systems, as well as the
important part these institutions play in the economy, it is unsurprising that they are
highly regulated and becoming more so. There are a variety o f regulatory tools and
approaches to optimizing the amount and type o f bank regulation, including address
ing the problem o f bank runs. We consider these in the next section.
B. Banking Regulation Basics
There are two central issues in banking regulation. The first is the moral hazard
problem created by FDIC insurance, itself an attempt to solve the bank run problem.
Depositors need not worry about whether the bank invests prudently and whether the
bank is adequately capitalized. Instead, the FDIC and the federal government bear
that risk. In other words, the solution to alleviating one sort o f risk— the rational
panic— actually induces more risk-taking behavior on the part o f banks because more
o f the banks’ costs can be externalized onto third parties. Short o f a radical change

/2CL4-YTFD] (“By law, after insured depositors are paid, uninsured depositors are paid next,
followed by general creditors and then stockholders.”).
46. According to Lehman Brothers’ last 10-Q, filed for the second quarter of 2008,
Lehman’s stockholders had positive equity of $26 billion. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q) 6 (May 31, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/806085
/000110465908045115/a08-18 147_110q.htm [https://perma.ee/GTP2-WCHR].
47. See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
Brookings Papers on Econ. A ctivity, Fall 2010, at 261-262.
48. For a full discussion, see F in. C risis Inquiry C omm ’n, T he F inancial C risis
Inquiry R eport (2011), http://fcie-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final
_report_full.pdf [https://perma.ee/SWY7-RXMWI. The introduction notes the centrality of
the Lehman failure: “In addition, the government’s inconsistent handling of major linancial
institutions during the crisis—the decision to rescue Bear Steams and then to place Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, followed by its decision not to save Lehman
Brothers and then to save AIG—increased uncertainty and panic in the market.” Id. at xxi.
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to our entire banking system ,19 this government guarantee generates a social liability
that means even many “small-government types” wholeheartedly support a robust
and vigorous system o f banking regulation/0
The second is that banks are thought to generate significant externalities, both
positive and negative, such that a bank’s owners and managers will have incentives
that are not always in line with the best interests o f society. On the positive external
ity side, banks play a central role in the creation o f credit and the expansion o f the
money supply. The government is, to an extent, dependent on banks to help the econ
omy run and expand, and if banks are unwilling to lend, as they were in the recent
financial crisis, the governm ent’s plans to kick-start the economy will be greatly
hampered.51 Hence, a significant problem can be, at times, banks taking on too little
risk and engaging in too little banking activity.
On the negative externality side, bank failures have consequences that may extend
beyond the bank’s shareholders and depositors. Following a relatively conventional
account o f systemic risk in the banking system, bank failure causes external harms
by reducing confidence in payment systems, causing losses to counterparties who
cannot properly calculate counterparty credit risk, and depressing asset prices as the
bank scurries to offload its assets. These in turn can lead other banks into crisis
(sometimes referred to as financial contagion).52 More prosaically, losses to bondholders
and other creditors are externalities from the bank’s shareholders’ point o f view.
Thus, any system o f bank regulation must attempt to encourage a robust amount
o f banking activity— credit being the lifeblood o f a modern economy— while not
allowing banks and bank shareholders to run totally rampant, maximizing profits at
the expense o f society as a whole.
Before considering some o f the regulatory techniques designed to solve the
problems created by deposit insurance and other banking externalities, it is important
to note that all o f them can be thought o f as regulating either the amount o f banking
activity (“activity level regulation”) or about how careful the bank is in its activities
(“due care regulation”). These are the familiar objects o f tort law, and therefore the

49. If bank runs are nol a systemic problem, then one could imagine a return to the private
banking model that prevailed for much of U.S. history. Individual banks would issue currency
whose value would depend on the market’s evaluation of the riskiness. See T homas L. Hogan,
Cato Inst., C ompetition in C urrency: T he Potential for P rivate Money (2012), http://
www.eato.org/publications/poliey-analysis/competition-curreney-potential-private-money [https://
perma.cc/3M'l'3-ALEU]; see also David G lasner, F ree Banking A nd Monetary Reform
(2005). We view the likelihood of such a radical change, whatever its merits, as vanishingly
small.

50. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter?
The Dangerous Allure o f Mark to Market, 36 J. Corp . L. 513, 525 (2011) (“In this environ
ment, the rationale for banking regulation, which even small-government types support, runs
as follows.”).
51. See, e.g., Stephen Gandcl, Study: Bank Bailout Didn 7 Boost Small Business Lending,
Fortune (N ov. 14, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/ll/14/study-bank-bailout-didnt-boost
-small-business-lending/1https://perma.ee/EBP6-SBET],
52. For an example of the application of this argument, see generally V iral V. Acharya,
Matthew R ichardson, Stun van N if.uwerburgii& Lawrence J. White, G uaranteed To
Fail : Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the D ebacle of Mortgage F inance (2011).
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literature on optim al regulation o f accidents can be a useful analog in evaluating the
efficacy o f banking regulation.5.
A t all levels and am ong all regulators,54 banking regulation is designed to ensure
the “ safety and soundness” o f banks.55 Safety and soundness are related but different
concepts. Safety is about ensuring that depositors have a safe place to put their
m oney, w here they know it will not be squandered or lost due to fraud, errors o f
judgm ent, or bad luck. Safety, or the appearance o f safety, reduces the threat o f bank
runs, w hich benefits everyone. Soundness is about ensuring banks are well m anaged
and m aintain adequate levels o f capital against losses. A lthough these have been the
pillars o f banking regulation since the Founding, there are m any w ays in which
regulators can try to achieve the optim al levels o f safety and soundness, and these
have changed over tim e.
1. Prudential Regulation
From the beginning o f the Republic and for hundreds o f years, safety and
soundness regulation focused prim arily on substantive regulation o f banking prac
tices, w hat is often called “ prudential regulation.”56 Federal and state laws lim ited
entry into the banking business, defined the types o f businesses and activities banks
could engage in,57 required approval for “fundam ental changes” to bank ow nership
or activities,5S and lim ited lending activities, including capping loans to any one
borrow er,59 specifying levels and types o f interbank lending,60 and dram atically
restricting lending to bank executives or other insiders.61
T he conceit o f this regulatory m odel is to im pose a one-size-fits-all rule restricting
banks from doing specific things that m ight cause their depositors losses or lead to
reduced stability in the banking system (that is, cause losses for depositors at other
banks). For purposes o f perspective, it is interesting to note that this m ode o f regula
tion— w hich w e term a form o f ex ante regulation— used to also be the norm for
corporation law generally. H istorically, nonbank businesses had to seek governm en
tal approval before they could engage in any type o f business, and corporate charters

53. See, e.g., Stevf.n Shavell, Economic A nalysis of Accident Law (1987).
54. Although not relevant to our analysis, it should be noted that for a variety of reasons,
the United Stales has a dual banking system, meaning there is bank regulation at both the state
and federal level, and banks generally have a choice between them. In addition, banking activ
ity can take place through either a “bank” or a “thrift,” each of which has a different regulator
at the federal and state level. This means there are at least four choices, which generates signifi
cant amounts o f regulatory competition. This choice has traditionally made a difference on a
number of dimensions, such as reserve requirements, capitalization standards, and branching
rules. For a discussion o f the history and structure of U.S. regulation o f banks, see R ichard
Scott C arnell, Jonathan R. M acey & G eoffrey P. M iller, T he L aw of Banking and
Financial Institutions 2-34, 62-66 (4th cd. 2009).
55. See id. at 251-67.
56. See id. at 1-25, 251-54.
57. See e g., id. at 107-28.
58. See id. at 86-91; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 214a-215a (2012).
59. See C arnell et al., supra note 54, at 296-300.
60. See id. at 302-04.
61. See id. al 304-07.
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were bespoke, in that they restricted firm activity to enumerated areas. This system
of ex ante regulation of corporate formation died over a hundred years ago as New
Jersey and then Delaware liberalized chartering requirements so that businesses
could engage in any business activity, subject only to ex post regulation, such as
litigation.62 Rules forbidding deals with insiders also faded in favor of a disclosure
and approval regime.6' The only remaining form of pervasive ex ante regulation of
nonbank activities is in certain business activities, such as pharmaceuticals or energy
production, where there might be potential harms that are difficult to remedy ex post.
Even potentially dangerous consumer products are not required to get a governmen
tal approval before they are sold; we rely on the ex post tort system of products liabil
ity to optimize care and activity levels.
In banking, however, ex ante approval for activities persists. For example, section
24(7) of the National Bank Act provides that banks—called “associations”— are
permitted to engage only in the “business of banking” and any businesses “neces
sary” to carry out the business of banking.64 The power to construe these ambiguous
terms is delegated to the various regulatory agencies that oversee banks, such as the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).65 The regulators have generally
taken a permissive attitude, allowing banks to enter into many business activities
tenuously related to banking. For instance, the OCC has opined, over the objections
of incumbents in the particular industry, that banks can offer travel agency services,
sell annuities, provide Internet transaction services, and many other things hardly
“necessary” to the business o f banking.66
As in the regulation of corporate purpose, such ex ante regulation is fraught with
problems. Regulators deciding whether to allow a particular bank to offer travel
agency services or sell securities, for instance, do not know how efficient or effective
the bank will be at offering the services, how much customer demand there will be,
whether customers will be happy with the services provided, and what the potential
risks are from the activity. To be sure, regulators have some experience with banks
in general and, perhaps, the activity sought to be done by the bank, but they have less
information about private and social costs and benefits than if they waited until the
bank started offering the service and then reevaluated. The quantity and quality of
information is increasing in time.

62. See e.g., Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition fo r Corporate Charters
and the Rise and Decline o f New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 351 (2007).
63. Id. at 350-53. The modem Delaware rule permits transactions with insiders under
certain circumstances, such as disclosure o f the conflict and a ratification by disinterested
shareholders. See D el. Code A nn . tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (2012). 12 U.S.C. Section 92 permits national banks to engage in
insurance agency activities if they are “located and doing business in any place the population
o f which does not exceed five thousand.” 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2012). The purpose o f this provision,
added to the National Bank Act in 1916, appears straightforward: to provide people living in
small towns with access to insurance agency services, which might otherwise be unavailable
or available only on non-compctitive terms.
65. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 522 (2009) (applying
Chevron deference to the OCC).
66. See Carnell et al ., supra note 54, at 127-73.
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There are other problems. Even if regulators had good information about the costs
and benefits of a particular type of activity on average, it is possible, perhaps even
likely, that the net of these differs significantly across different banks, making a onesize-fits-all approach both over- and underinclusive. While Bank 1 might be able to
engage in a particular activity in a way that generates significant social welfare, Bank
2 may not. Crucially, the regulators may not know this before Bank 1 and 2 are able
to demonstrate it through actual practice.
Another problem is that the decision on whether to permit a particular type of
activity will be influenced by factors unrelated to the efficiency or safety and sound
ness questions. Regulatory capture is a well-known and significant phenomenon,
meaning regulators may be too willing to approve activities in some cases, while too
willing to deny them when powerful competitors use their influence.67 Importantly,
these problems, which plague regulation at any time, may be more significant for ex
ante regulation, since conjectures are easier to counter or disprove than facts. One
need only observe the large number of bank frauds in, and general mismanagement
of, thrifts during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, as well as the shady bank
ing practices in the mortgage industry more recently, to see the perils of relying too
heavily on an ex ante screening mechanism to keep banking standards high.68
Finally, often the real risk for banks and from banking arises not from forays into
unrelated fields, like insurance or travel services, but rather from core banking activi
ties. While a small local bank might be put in peril by over-lending to a particular
individual, chicanery by insiders, or unsuccessfully entering into unrelated busi
nesses, in the world of large, modern banks, systemic risk is much more likely to
arise from bad investment decisions at the macro level in the banking industry as a
whole. As a case in point, WaMu’s losses stemmed not from exotic derivatives or
speculative side bets, but rather from its core home lending business.69
So although these ex ante rules and requirements are still on the books, they are
much less an important part of systemic risk regulation today. Another form of ex
ante regulation, risk-based capital requirements, plays an increasingly important
regulatory role. The logic of moving from regulation of business activities to capital
requirements is straightforward. The significant information problems faced when
determining the risk from specific activities ex ante go away when banks are free to
do whatever they want, so long as they maintain sufficient “insurance,” in the form

67. See, e . g Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Government's Elite and Regulatory Cap
ture, N.Y. Times : Dealbook. (June 11, 2010, 2:00 PM) https://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2010/06/11/the-govemments-elite-and-regulatory-capturc/? r=0 [https://permacc/Z6DF-XWMG]
(arguing that Wall Street largely shapes top-down financial regulation to benefit itself).
68. See Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 19; Curry & Shibut, supra note 17.
69. Wash. Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16-17 (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000l04746908002083/a2182890zl0-k.htm
| https://perma.cc/8V7Q-BQQ7| (WaMu’s deterioration was “primarily the result of signifi
cant credit deterioration in the Company’s single-family residential mortgage loan portfolio
and significant disruptions in the capital markets, including a sudden and severe contraction
in secondary mortgage market liquidity for nonconforming residential loan products. These
conditions also contributed to the impairment o f all goodwill associated with the Company’s
Home Loans business near the end of 2007.”).
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of minimum levels of equity capital that can be brought down without endangering
the health of the bank’s creditors.
2. Capital and Reserve Regulation
Absent banking externalities, there would be no need for government-mandated
capital regulation, since banks that did not keep enough cash on hand would be driven
out of business, and banks that did not maintain an adequate amount of equity to
cushion the losses of depositors and other creditors would not be able to raise funds.
But the externalization problem— bank runs, government insurance, and other bank
ing externalities—means the laissez-faire equilibrium bank behavior would not be at
the social optimum. As noted above, private monitoring is inefficiently low given
government insurance, which means that the market, if left alone, will reach an
equilibrium that is privately optimal (to shareholders and bank managers), but cer
tainly not optimal from a societal perspective.70 It is important to note that the optimal
reserve and capital amounts will vary across firms, depending on their activities,
experiences, skills, and other variables.
To solve the problem of inefficient market pressure, government estimates the
optimal point and then requires all banks maintain a minimum amount of regulatory
capital. Because the optimal reserve capital cannot sensibly be one number for large
and small banks, regulators determine the amount of regulatory capital as a ratio of
capital to firm size, usually determined by assets. For many years, the typical ratio
was known as the “leverage limit,” which was the total bank capital to total bank
assets, where, roughly speaking, bank capital is a measure of shareholder equity,
while total bank assets is the bank’s entire portfolio of loans, mortgages, cash on
hand, and any other investments.71 To satisfy the regulatory requirement, banks had
to keep at least four percent of capital to assets.72 Although the ratio concept is
straightforward, it is complicated to determine what precisely goes into total capital
and what liabilities on (and off) the balance sheet should be considered in determin
ing the numerator and denominator.
Putting these complexities aside, however, one can easily see the over- and
underinclusiveness problem with using a single, ex ante leverage ratio to determine
the optimal bank capital. Four percent will be too low for some banks, while it will
be too high for others. To be sure, banks with greater risks may voluntarily hold more
than four percent, but because of government insurance, whatever amount they hold
will be less than they would hold if subjected to efficient market forces. So, although
ex ante capital regulation has the benefit of not micromanaging bank decision making
and substituting the judgment of bureaucrats for bankers, it suffers from a significant
problem that faces all ex ante regulation.
The one-size-fits-all problem became a significant problem during the 1980s, as
banks became more heterogeneous in the type of risks they were taking on.73 Greater

70. See supra Part I.A.
71. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (2013); 12 C.F.R. § 6.4(b)(2)(iii) (2016); see also Carnellet
al., supra note 54, at 256-57.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (2013); 12 C.F.R. § 6.4(b)(2)(iii) (2016).
73. See Peter J. Wallison, Why Do We Regulate Banks?, Regulation (Winter 2005-06),
https://object.cato.org/sites/calo.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2005/12/v28n4-2.pdf [https://
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sophistication and diversification of bank activities necessitated an approach to
regulatory capital that recognized this change. To address risk heterogeneity, in 1988
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, proposed a
regulatory requirement of eight percent capital to risk-adjusted assets.74 This was a
nod in the direction of a capital policy tailored to individual bank risks and quality,
but because it was executed ex ante it necessarily maintained a one-sized-fits-all ap
proach—eight percent capital for certain risks might be too much, too little, or just
right, depending on the bank. Most countries adopted the Basel Accord (known as
“Basel I”), including the United States.75
Other than the inclusivity problem noted above, the eight percent rule seemed to
work well for many years, allowing some tailoring of capital requirements to bank
risk. But by the early 2000s, regulators concluded the rule was ill suited for large
banks operating across borders and in highly sophisticated markets. Accordingly, the
BIS promulgated a new capital reserve regime in 2004. Basel II made many
changes,76 but the core was permitting large, sophisticated banks to tailor their riskbased capital reserves by either: (1) an enumerated asset-specific risk assessment;77
or (2) the bank’s internal risk assessment models.78 For instance, for the first ap
proach, sovereign debt did not count toward liabilities, while 20% of exposure to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) banks counted,
50% of residential mortgages, and 100% of consumer loans and other unsecured
debt.79 Again, this adjustment to the ex ante regulatory regime was an attempt to
tailor risk, but clearly shows the problems of blanket rules, as well as attempts to
predict the risk of particular bank activities as general categories. For one, greater
weighting may encourage regulatory arbitrage, as in the use of credit instruments to
move certain risks off of bank balance sheets. In addition, as the housing bubble and
ensuing financial crisis shows, exposure to residential mortgages was riskier than
believed, and not all banks holding it were good ones or worthy of the same risk
weighting.
The numerous bank failures of the past few years point to the problem of relying
too heavily on ex ante capital requirements, especially ones linked to rating-agency-

perma.cc/8RMI-TEDR |.
74. See Basel C apital A ccord (B asel I), Basel C omm , on Banking Supervision,
Bank for Int ’l Settlements, International C onvergence of C apital Measurement
and C apital Standards 14 (1988), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28b.pdf [https://pcrma.cc
/6RXC-KJKR|.
75. See id.
76. The three pillars o f the revised Basel accord were capital (sole focus of Basel 1); mar
ket discipline (mandatory disclosure of bank’s condition); and regulatory supervision. Basel
C omm ’n on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int ’l Settlements, International
Convergence of Capital M easurement and C apital Standards 6 (2006), http://www.bis
.org/publ/bcbsl 28. pdf [https://perma.ee/NN5H-FSIIF],
77. One hundred percent o f government, etc. tied to rating agencies. Whoops.
78. See B asel C omm ’n on Banking S upervision, supra note 76, at 19, 52. Basel II also
added in the concept o f “operational risk,” which simply meant adding in some additional
capital as a cushion in the event of a failure in the bank’s operations, computer systems, or the
like. Id. at 144.
79. See id.; see also C arnell ET AL., supra note 54, at 257-65 (showing how to perform
capital calculations under the rules).
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based assessments o f risk or internal bank models. Capital, however defined, seems
to be evidence o f bank weakness after the fact, rather than a predictor o f it in advance.
If a bank makes bad or overly risky investments, it is not until those asset prices
actually fall that the bank shareholder equity shrinks, making it then under
capitalized.80 Moreover, ex ante regulatory approaches such as this may generate
false confidence that disarms whatever market pressure would otherwise exist.
3. The Regulatory Veto
Perhaps out o f recognition o f these problems, the existing regulatory regime for
banks includes an uncommon feature: regulators, called bank examiners, have the
power to shut down bank activities midstream if the regulators believe the social
costs are too high. We call this feature a regulatory veto, since it is a determination
about whether existing activities should and can continue, made after they have com
menced but before they have completed.81 After loans or investments have been
made, bank regulators are authorized to veto a bank’s operations based on an assess
ment o f the social welfare o f the bank’s choice about its type and amount o f activi
ties.8' The veto can take the form o f a modification o f the way the business is being
conducted or a winding down and termination o f the business.83
For instance, if a bank decides to engage in lending concentrated in a particular
industry or geography, the regulator could decide that the social risks are too high,
and therefore demand the bank to stop lending, alter its origination standards, in
crease oversight o f the portfolio, take on more capital against losses, or shut down
the particular lending or the entire bank.84 The key virtue o f the regulatory veto is
that it is made after a decision about whether to engage in the activity has been made
by bankers and after regulators can observe social cost o f those activities. The idea
is to find the point where the information about costs and benefits o f the activity in
question is at a high point relative to the expected cost o f delay. A more efficient
allocation o f resources may be possible because shareholders can act on their signal
o f prospective firm value, and regulators can act based on an ex post signal o f firm
value and riskiness.
The topology o f regulatory choices is shown in Figure 2.

80. this is assuming mark-to-market accounting. In book value accounting, where banks
do not need to write down asset values, the bank could still remain adequately capitalized for
regulatory purposes, even though in real terms it is not. See Epstein & Henderson, supra note
50, at 537. See also M ishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 410-12.
81 . See, e.g., M ishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 433-35.
82. For a discussion of bank examiners’ powers, see Henderson & Tung, supra note 13,
at 1021-23.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Figure 2. Topology of Regulatory Mechanisms
The regulatory veto is designed to allow timely and tailored regulatory
intervention. It allows information about regulatory costs and benefits to be learned
by regulators, who are watching banks closely. The presence o f an on-site examiner
is an opportunity for bank regulation to be different than other forms o f regulation,
which rely entirely on ex ante regulation, ex post regulation, or a mix thereof. Con
sider the regulation o f driving. We try to make roads safe by using a mix o f speed
limits (ex ante rules) and tort suits (ex post litigation) to produce the optimal amount
o f driving and care about driving. The blanket ex ante rules will, o f course, be overand underinclusive. It would be a social welfare improvement if we could design and
enforce rules based on the expected costs and benefits o f each driver. A racecar driver
could easily drive faster than the speed limit with less risk than a teenager driving
slower than it. However, it is simply too costly to write driver-specific rules, as the
monitoring and enforcement costs would simply be too high. Narrowly tailored rules
may be more efficient without considering the costs o f enforcement, but when they
are considered, rules o f general applicability, despite their clunkiness, may be
superior.
But if it is possible with reasonable cost to have rules designed to optimize the
social costs and benefits o f a particular actor, then regulation can be improved. In the
speed limit hypothetical, if the highway patrol could have an officer riding in every
car, then it might be possible to create local regulation that would be more efficient.
As discussed below, the examination process for banks is just that. Examiners sit at
banks, examining each bank’s activities for risk. If this process worked well, and we
show it does not at present, it could allow regulators to maximize the value o f regula
tion, and therefore improve social welfare, by reducing bank activities.
Some o f the details o f the examination process have been recounted in other
works,85 but it is worth summarizing some o f the specifics here. In practice, bank
examiners work full-time monitoring large bank activities for compliance with
regulations and established risk tolerances.86 An examination occurs once per year

85. See, e.g., id. at 1016-21.
86. Several federal agencies supervise banks: the OCC supervises national banks; the
Federal Reserve supervises state member banks and bank holding companies; and the FDIC
supervises state nonmember banks and FDIC-insured savings banks. See FDIC R eport , supra
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for routine cases, and more often as needed based on regulators’ views o f the riski
ness o f the bank in question.87 Many thousands o f person-hours are typically spent
conducting the examination o f large banks.88 Examiners judge the credit quality o f
each asset, that is, each loan or investment that has been made. The assessment is
made based on discussions with loan officers and bank managers. Examiners also
review loan portfolios as a whole for issues such as concentration risk, violations of
legal rules, and deviations from bank loan and underwriting policies. They also judge
other aspects o f bank activity, such as the affairs o f subsidiaries and affiliates, litiga
tion risks, off-balance-sheet activities, and activities o f insiders. Importantly, they do
this all after lending decisions have been made and after loans have experienced some
real-world conditions to put their risk into context.89
After the on-site examination is completed, the examiner first presents a report on
bank activities to management. Bank officials are able to comment on the report and
offer to fix any deficiencies. The report is also taken to the bank’s board o f directors,
which can promise to take corrective action to preempt regulatory action to shut
down bank activities that threaten systemic risk.90 For example, the decision to drop
a bank’s CAM ELSrating from 2 to 3 (moving the bank from “fundamentally sound”
to indicating “some degree o f supervisory concern”) precipitates formal or informal ac
tions, which include obtaining the bank’s written commitment to take corrective action.91

note 13, at 463. The FDIC also has backup supervisory responsibility for monitoring the condi
tion o f national banks and state member banks. In fulfilling these responsibilities, it works
with the other two federal regulatory agencies. Under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act o f 1989 (F1RREA), it also has backup authority to examine
thrift institutions as well. State banking departments supervise state-chartered banks. Id.
87. The frequency o f examination varies by agency and over time. For instance, the Na
tional Bank Act of 1864 mandated that the OCC examine all national banks twice a year but
allowed an extension to three examinations every two years. T his policy stood until 1974,
when the OCC moved toward off-site examinations using statistical methods, and the average
examination schedule was more like eighteen months. With the passage of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FD1CIA), on-site examinations were re
quired by law. By the late 1980s, resident examiners were placed in the largest multinational
banks, and by the 1990s, larger regional banks also got resident examiners. See FDIC Report,
supra 13, at 422-23. Similar changes were also true of FDIC and Treasury examinations.
FDIC examination periods varied from one to three years, depending on the CAMELS rating
of the bank in question. Like for the OCC, however, the FDICIA “mandated annual on-site
examinations of all banks except highly rated small institutions, for which the interval could
be extended to 18 months.” FDIC Report, supra note 13, at 425.
88. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1024-25.
89. See id.
90. The primary mechanism for examiner action is the bank’s CAMELS rating. Examin
ers rate banks on a scale o f 1 (good) to 5 (bad) in each of six areas— Capital adequacy, Asset
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk— and then assign a
composite score. A score o f 1 means a bank is performing far above average; 2, the most
common score, means “fundamentally sound”; 3 means “some degree o f supervisory con
cern”; 4 means generally unsafe and unsound conditions; and 5 means severe problems and
likely failure within one year. See Office of T hrift Supervision, OTS E xamination
Handbook Section 070 070.4-070.5 (2011).
91. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Uniform Financial Institutions Rating Sys
tem, 62 Fed. Reg. 752 (Jan. 6, 1997), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/ufir.pdf
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For bank activities that are determined to pose excessive risk or are otherwise not
compliant with banking rules and regulations, examiners have enormous power to
change bank practices. The regulatory pressure can be either explicit or implicit,
backed by a threat o f legal enforcement, including orders to curtail particular activi
ties. For instance, section 8 o f the Federal Deposit Insurance Act gives various bank
regulators vast power to curtail unsafe or unsound banking practices (that is, exces
sively risky activities) through the use or threat o f cease and desist orders, removal
o f managers, or imposition o f civil fines.92 The threat o f formal regulatory action is
used to pressure banks into informal accommodation o f regulatory wishes, through
agreements known as “memoranda o f understanding.”9’ When informal action is in
effective at restricting banking excesses, regulators have the power to take formal,
legal action. For instance, cease and desist orders are authorized where bank
regulators believe a bank’s activities are likely to result in a “significant dissipation
o f assets or earnings” or are likely to “weaken” the bank or “prejudice” its custom
ers.94 Although rarely used, as we discuss and criticize below, these powers are con
strued to be broad enough to prevent excessive risk taking by banks. The government
report on the failure o f the bank WaMu describes the examiner role this way: “ [The
regulator] is responsible for monitoring an institution’s risk to the [the taxpayers].
[The regulator] had authority to perform its own examination o f WaMu and impose
enforcement action to protect the [the taxpayers].”95
The on-site examination process is meant to take place after loans happen but
before it is too late. The examination process is designed to “ identify the risk o f fail
ure in troubled institutions in sufficient time for supervisors to take corrective action”
and therefore avoid social losses that cannot be remedied through traditional ex post
litigation processes.96 Another important tool available to examiners is a follow-up
enforcement action, which is designed to “control the risk-taking behavior o f prob
lem banks after they have been identified.”97 Thus, banking regulation is not so much
about preapproval for a decision to make a particular loan or type o f loan, but rather
an ongoing check on whether the lending decisions that have been made are accepta
ble from a social welfare standpoint. If they are not, the examiners have the power
to force the bank to change its underwriting policies or raise additional money (that
is, buy insurance against failure).
The regulatory veto is rare in law, but, as discussed below, we believe it is the
essential feature o f banking regulation. Why give bank regulators the power to con
trol business activities and even shut down entire firms? In the model o f regulation
we develop, the regulatory veto may be necessary if other forms o f regulation are
insufficient to optimize the amount o f firm activity because o f ex ante information

[https://perma.cc/2UFK-CWVRI. I'his written commitment commonly comes in the form of
a board resolution creating a Memorandum ofUnderstanding between the bank and the regula
tor. See FD1C Report, supra note 13, at 473.
92. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (b), (e), (i)(2) (2012).
93. See supra note 9 1.
94. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (2012).
95. Wa Mu Report, supra note 11, at 35.
96. FDIC Report, supra note 13, at 439.
97. Id. at 432.
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deficiencies. We consider the various regulatory options, including no regulation, ex
post litigation, and the banking analog of command-and-control regulation, showing
why they are insufficient to maximize the value of banking. We then show why add
ing the regulatory veto option can improve social welfare, but point out how it is
commonly used in a suboptimal way that perversely undercuts its purpose.
C. Regulatory Reform Proposals
Commentators have offered a variety of explanations for the failure of bank
regulation, having to do with issues such as the incentives of bank CEOs, banks being
“too big to fail,” and the failure of bankers, customers, and regulators to understand
new financial products. Each of these alleged causes have generated reform pro
posals targeted at a specific alleged cause. Crucially, all of them fall into either the
ex ante or ex post methods of regulation. In the ex ante category are restrictions on
executive pay to change banker incentives to engage in particular activities, limita
tions on the size of banks (including the so-called Volcker Rule), new disclosures
required for specific products, and a proposed requirement for government
preapproval of financial products. In the ex post category are new rules requiring
claw backs for certain monies paid to executives before accounting restatements, in
creased insurance requirements (in the form of convertible capital, for instance), and
calls by many for more civil and even criminal cases against banks for the losses
suffered by borrowers and taxpayers.
A series of recent papers focuses on ex ante incentives of bankers. Sanjai Bhagat
and Roberta Romano propose paying bank CEOs with more long-term equity;
specifically, that all-equity options vest only after the CEO has left the bank.98 Lucian
Bebchuk and Holger Spamann propose changing the mix of CEO pay to include more
debt in order to give bank CEOs better down-side risk incentives.99 They want banks
to do less of certain types of activities and propose achieving this by changing the
rewards CEOs get from engaging in them.1110 In a friendly amendment, Fred Tung
has proposed paying bankers in part with the publicly held subordinated debt securi
ties of individual banks.101 His argument is that the Bebchuk and Spamann proposal,
which pays in the debt of bank parents (known as “bank holding companies”
(BHCs)), would offer a noisy signal of the expected downside of particular risk tak
ing.102 He argues that paying in subordinated debt issued by individual banks, rather
than their BHC parents, would offer better ex ante incentives for optimal risk tak
ing. 102 These proposals are supported by empirical research done by Tung, along with

98. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Commuting to the Long-Term, 26 Y ale J. ON Reg . 359 (2009). This proposal is similar
to one made more generally by the authors. See M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler,
Corporate Heroin: A Defense o f Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93
G eo .L.J. 1835 (2005).
99. Lucian A. Bebchuk & I lolger Spamann, Regulating Bankers ’Pay, 98 Geo. L.J. 247 (2009).
100. See id. at 249-51.
101. See Frederick lung, Pay fo r Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensa
tion fo r Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev . 1205 (2011).
102. Id. at 1208, 1244-48.
103. Id. at 1229-34.
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coauthor Xue Wang, finding that bank CEOs with greater amounts o f compensation
contingent o f bank solvency (e.g., deferred compensation) took less risk than other
bank CEOs during the run up to the great financial crisis.'04
A different set o f papers focuses on the incentives o f regulators. Fred Tung and
one o f the authors propose paying bank examiners with a mix o f the equity and debt
o f the banks they regulate in order to improve their incentives to take actions to opti
mize bank regulation and to intervene where necessary to limit bank losses.105 In a
follow-on paper, they propose improving examiner incentives further by using an
auction method to allocate regulatory resources.106 Under their proposal, examiners
would choose banks to regulate, rather than the other way around, thereby helping to
ensure a better fit, to ensure the production o f more information about bank risk, and
to discourage regulatory capture. These proposals are the most related to the argu
ment we present in this Article, since they focus not on ex ante or ex post regulation
o f banks, but instead on the incentives o f regulators. As discussed below, our argu
ment identifies regulatory failure as the primary source o f recent banking failures,
and highlights the need to improve regulatory design.
Focusing instead on ex ante restrictions on bank size, law professor Jonathan
Macey and banker James Holdcroft, Jr. propose limiting the size o f banks in order to
reduce the costs o f individual bank failure.107 They argue that the only way the
government can credibly commit to not bailing out banks that take excessive risks is
to break them up so that failure is an option. Their proposal would prohibit any bank
from amassing liabilities that exceed five percent o f the value o f the FD1C insurance
fund.108 According to James Kwak, coauthor o f 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Take
over and the Next Financial Meltdown, as o f 2010, this would limit the size o f any
bank’s liabilities to $3 billion, meaning the proposal would break up “over two hun
dred’’ banks.109 (The asset-limiting proposal in 13 Bankers is timid in comparison,
proposing to break up only the six banks larger than $270 billion.)110 The chief virtue
o f the Macey and Floldcroft proposal is that it takes advantage o f the private infor
mation held by bankers about their efficiency at engaging in certain activities. They
argue that their approach “does not require any restrictions on activities o f banks or
on the location o f those activities o f any kind.” 1" At the same time, their one-size-

104. Frederick 'l ung & Xue Wang. Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global
Financial Crisis 27 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011).
105. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1008.
106. See M. l odd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auc
tion Approach to Regulatory Assignments, 98 IOWA L. Rf,V. 1895, 1898-99 (2013).
107. See Macey & IJoldcroft, supra note 26, at 1370-71.
108. See id. at 1371.
109. S imon J ohnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: T he Wall Street T akeover and the
N ext F inancial Meltodwn (2011); see also James Kwak, S3 Billion Banks, T he Baseline
Scenario (Apr. 26, 2011), http://baselinescenario.com/20ll/04/26/3-billion-banks/
[https://perma.cc/5V5S-2CN3l (“Their proposed limit is 5 percent of the FDIC Deposit
Insurance Fund, which itself is 1.15 percent of total insured deposits, so the limit would work
out to $3 billion as of 2010.”).
110. See J ohnson & Kwak, supra note 109.
111. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 26, at 1404.
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fits-all proposal would result in “ lost economies o f scale,” but they believe these
would be “offset by the . .. savings realized by avoiding future bailouts.” 112
A related proposal— the so-called Volcker Rule— would limit banks from using
their own cash to engage in certain types o f investments to discourage risk tak in g ."3
The rule would apply to all banks, regardless o f their financial position, skill, history,
or any other factor relevant to their ability to efficiently engage in this type o f activ
ity. In other words, these proposals apply a one-size-fits-all limit on the amount of
activity any bank can engage in, regardless o f its quality.
Even more aggressively, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl propose an FDA for financial
products to prescreen financial products along the dimension o f social welfare. This
proposal envisions government agents assessing the value and potential cost o f bank
activities before the bank engages in them.
Each o f these proposals (except Henderson and Tung’s focusing on regulators)
shares three things in common. First, they are all attempts to reduce bank activity
levels, either in general or in specific types o f activities. Second, all o f these proposed
reforms amount to command-and-control regulation designed to substitute the judg
ment o f “experts” in government for the judgm ent o f the managers, shareholders,
creditors, and customers o f banks. Finally, all involve regulatory decisions being
made with regard to neither a bank’s profit opportunities nor regulators’ information
about systemic risks created by bank activities.
The reform proposals discussed above have little promise for limiting systemic
risk. Some o f them simply do not address the root causes excessive risk taking, and
several o f those that do are likely to be overly burdensome on productive banking
activity and the economy in general. In other words, the reforms will either not work
or err too far on the side o f constraining bank activities at the expense o f social
welfare.
* * *

As we show in the next section, these modes o f regulation have problems. All of
ex ante regulation is faced with either a problem o f ineffectiveness or limited infor
mation and overbroadness. Ex post measures are hampered by judgm ent proofness
and uninsurability due to systemic risk. The regulatory veto, while promising as a
means o f increasing the information available to regulators and allowing bank-by
bank application o f prudential rules, suffers from a serious structural problem that,
in its current form, renders it ineffective.

II. A Simple Model of Regulation of Bank Risk T aking
In this part, we offer a simple model to examine the various regulatory choices
available to regulators and explore the strengths and weaknesses o f each. As it turns
out, there are serious shortcomings o f ex ante and ex post regulation, as well as the
regulatory veto.

112. Id. at 1368.
113. For a good summary of the Volcker Rule, see generally William J. Sweet, Jr. & Brian
D. Christiansen, The Volcker Rule, Skadden (July 9, 2010) https://www.skadden.com
/newsletters/FSR_The_Volcker_Rule.pdf [https://perma.ee/KYJ8-WAAB].
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Ex post measures of risk regulation (namely, postharm litigation and mandatory
preharm insurance) will not work, because it is in precisely those cases where risk
materializes as reality that the firm will be insolvent and unable to pay. Insurance, a
common solution to the judgment-proofness problem, is ineffective because systemic
risks are likely to put unbearable pressure on insurance companies.
Ex ante regulation avoids the problem of judgment-proof banks. However, all
forms of ex ante regulation of banking activity suffer from a severe informational
problem: the regulator acting ex ante does so based on limited information in
prescribing what actions may be taken and does not take into account information it
may subsequently learn about the firm’s production and potential systemic risk. In
addition, ex ante regulation is typically of a one-size-fits-all variety and fails to allow
for heterogeneity among firms, financial products, and customer needs. As a result,
ex ante regulation of banking activity is unlikely to yield the optimal level of banking
activity. It will either prove ineffective and gameable by industrious banks, or else
be a significant drain on both the banking sector and the wider economy. These prob
lems are generally true of all the forms of ex ante regulation we identify: size limits,
prudential regulation, financial transactions taxes, command-and-control, and
incentive-based approaches.
In addition, as we show, some forms of ex ante regulation are poorly designed to
limit systemic risk. For instance, prudential regulation, such as the capital adequacy
ratios required under the Basel Accords, does little to prevent systemic risk taking.
Prudential regulation may serve a purpose in protecting the financial firm’s creditors:
it constrains borrowing (and hence activity levels) relative to the amount of equity
shareholders have at risk in the firm. By construction, however, prudential regulation
based only on debt/equity ratios does not guard against systemic risk or externalities
outside of the firm’s direct stakeholders, and hence cannot generate optimal social
welfare incentives.
We then turn to what we call the regulatory veto—the system of bank examination
and the bank examiner’s power to shut down a bank based on examination results.
Unlike the other forms of ex post regulation, litigation and insurance, the regulatory
veto is not subject to the problem of judgment proofness because it does not wait for
the harm to actually occur. Unlike ex ante regulation, the regulator does not prescribe
limits on banking activities, and is able to wait and consider additional information
before making a decision on letting the bank operate or shutting it down before
greater harm is incurred. In other words, ex ante regulation happens too soon, while
ex post regulation happens too late. The regulatory veto could be, as Goldilocks said,
just right.
Unfortunately, as we then show, the regulatory veto has a serious structural
problem: by allowing the bank to move first, the regulator finds itself subject to a
form of the ultimatum game, and hence may accept banking activities that are, on
net, harmful to society. Hence, the regulatory veto will require some fixes to work
well, a problem we turn to in Part IV.

A. The Model
To explore how banking regulation works—or, as it largely turns out, does not
work—we utilize a simple economic model. Our model economy consists of (i) a
bank (or, equivalently, a financial firm engaged in shadow banking), (ii) the bank’s
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shareholder, who manages the firm and earn its profits, (iii) the bank’s creditors, who
provide much o f its working capital, and (iv) the regulator, who may undertake
various sorts o f regulatory measures to attempt to maximize social welfare. The crux
o f the model is that equity holders (and, to some extent, the firm ’s bondholders) have
an interest in taking more risk than is optimal from a societal standpoint, owing to
the limited downside o f both debt and equity holders.
One criticism o f the model, which we point out here at the beginning, is that there
is no separate manager; in contrast, this is a banking firm without agency cost, run
completely in line with the shareholders’ interests. We omit a measure o f agency cost
for two reasons. The first is to demonstrate how pernicious the problem o f bank
shareholder incentives are with regard to excessive risk taking: even without
assuming bad bank executives (a common refrain heard in the wake o f the financial
crisis), we show that exactly the same excessive risk-taking behavior is to be
expected. The second reason to omit agency cost is that it sig n ific a n t complicates
the analysis— among other things, the manager can sometimes be turned usefully
against the shareholders— and is deserving o f its own treatment, which we do in a
separate paper (or papers) in which we examine various proposals to regulate bank
manager pay.
1. The Banking Firm and Its Projects
Our bank or financial firm is funded with some amount D o f debt and an amount
e o f equity. The firm uses this capital to invest in financial assets. For simplicity and
concreteness, we will suppose that each project costs a dollar. However, banking
projects vary in the following ways. First, there are two general types o f banking
projects, low- and high-risk projects, denoted as / and h projects, respectively. These
projects are essentially coin flips o f varying amounts. We will assume that each of
the / and h projects has a binary distribution, and that all o f the projects are perfectly
correlated with one another.1" Only a certain number o f each type o f project is
profitable: the first nLo f the low-risk projects pay off either $2 + n Lor n Lin the case
o f success or failure, respectively, with the probability o f success/failure at 50%. The
remainder o f the low-risk projects pay o ff only $2 or $0, so that their expected
profitability is zero.
Similarly, the first nh high-risk projects pay off $3 + n h or -$1 + n h for
success/failure with probability 50%. These first nh projects have an expected value
o f nh, while all the other high-risk projects have an expected value o f zero.
Both the number o f projects that are profitable (nl and n h) and their degree o f
profitability (nL and nh) are random variables whose distribution is common
knowledge. The firm and its shareholder observe the realization o f these variables
prior to undertaking any banking activity. The regulator, in contrast, knows only the
distributions o f these variables ex ante, though over time the regulator may gain more

114. While perfect correlation across all projects is certainly an unrealistic assumption, it
qualitatively changes little in our analysis. The addition of more projects, whether perfectly
correlated or independent, always increases the bank’s overall riskiness. In a prior draft, we
assumed imperfectly correlated normal distributions for bank projects; results there differ little
from here.
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information about their realizations. In short, it is socially beneficial for the bank to
undertake a certain number of banking projects; beyond that, however, all the the
bank does is increase risk, both for its security holders and, as we discuss below, for
the society in general.
2. Shareholders
There is a single-unit shareholder who both owns and runs the bank. The
shareholder has some private wealth endowment of e which she may invest in either
banking or nonbanking projects. Nonbanking projects pay a market rate of return of
r, while banking endeavors are allowed to vary according to the level and type of
investment.
Payoffs to the shareholder are not the same as the firm’s expected value, owing
to the option character of equity: in a firm with limited liability, equity holders
effectively have the option to purchase the firm’s realized cash flows for the value
of the oustanding debt. Notably, shareholders are free to walk away from a firm that
creates even catastrophic financial injury to others.
3. Bank Creditors
The bank’s capital structure also includes creditors, who have limited upside and
no control rights over the actions of the banks. Creditors, instead, can only discipline
the bank by withholding their credit from it. Depositors, for instance, who believe a
bank is poorly managed or undercapitalized such that depositors fear for their
deposits, will rationally run on the bank— causing it to shut down. Bondholders,
similarly, will refuse to lend new funds to the bank and refuse to roll over term debts
as they come due. Counterparties (those who engage in transactions such as securities
repurchase agreements and proprietary trading with the bank) may also choose to
stop doing business with the bank, robbing it of a source of short-term funds.
Unfortunately, the monitoring abilities or incentives of these creditors may be
severely limited. Depositors, who are covered by FDIC insurance, have no incentives
to run on a poorly run or undercapitalized bank. Bondholders lend for a term to the
bank, and hence have limited ability to get their funds back as conditions change.
More controversially, perhaps, the counterparties of a bank may not be able to
monitor the bank’s creditworthiness due to the complexities of the trades or the
anonymity of the short-term money markets.115
What all this means is that the bank’s cost of capital, at least in the short term,
will not reflect the actual risks that the bank imposes on its creditors. Depositors
simply do not care; counterparties do not always know with whom they are dealing,
and bondholders have limited ability to act in the short term. Banks and their
shareholders, then, have the ability to externalize much of their costs from risky
activities onto their creditors.

115. Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Counterparty Risk Externality: Centralized Versus
Over-The-Counter Markets, 149 J. ECON. T heory 153, 154-55 (2014).
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4. The Regulator and Systemic Risk
Banking activity is governed in some way by a banking regulator who acts to
maximize total societal welfare."6 Bank regulation is required in order to limit the
externalities that the bank and its shareholder can impose on others. Ordinarily, of
course, one would think that externalities imposed on creditors require no
government intervention: the firm’s cost of capital simply rises, as creditors with
rational expectations demand a higher return of banks that take on additional risks or
undesirable projects, or, alternatively, they require some monitoring and control
rights, such as a seat on the board, to manage the firm concordantly with their
interests. However, as discussed above,"7 these creditors do not necessarily have the
ability to fend for themselves: the FDIC does not get to choose where depositors put
their deposits, counterparties may not be able to sufficiently analyze their trades and
the bank’s creditworthiness,"8 and even bondholders may be subject to short-term
expropriation.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, is the concept of systemic risk. The
failure of a bank may lead to consequences far beyond just the bank’s various
security holders. Banks are always lending to one another in the money markets, such
that the failure o f one bank imposes losses on another. Banks often invest in the same
sorts of assets, such as residential mortgages. When a bank fails and attempts to sell
its assets, prices may be pushed lower in a form of “fire sale,” impacting other banks’
balance sheets and forcing them to sell assets as w ell."9 This is sometimes referred
to as financial contagion; though the existence and mechanics of financial contagion
and fire sales are controversial issues, the conventional wisdom is currently that they
exist and do impose significant losses on society.120 In any event, problems at one
bank may implicate or even infect other banks, leading the whole sector downward.
Finally, banks play integral roles in the modern economy. Producers rely on banks
for working credit and to finance capital investments. Homeowners (and the real
estate industry) depend upon banks to finance home building and sales. Consumers
rely on banks for payments systems. And the entire economy relies upon bank
lending to maintain the money supply. The failure of a significant portion of the
banking industry, therefore, significantly harms the wider economy, as it appears to
have done in the recent financial crisis.121 The fact that such significant externalities

116. Regulators may be motivated by private interests as well. See M. Todd Henderson,
The Changing Demand for Insider Trading Regulation, in Research Handbook on Insider
T rading 230 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013).
117. See supra Part 11.A.3.
118. See, e.g., Nils Beier, Holger Harreis, Thomas Poppensieker, Dirk Sojka & Mario
I’haten, Getting to Grips with Counterparty Risk (McKinsey & Co., Working Papers on Risk
No. 20, 2010).
119. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Fear o f Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking,
and Credit Freeze, 126 Q.J. Econ . 557, 557-59 (2011).
120. For an analysis and survey of fire sales, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire
Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, J. Econ . Persp., Winter 2011, at 29.
121. It is not universally accepted that the financial crisis caused the ensuing recession. For
example, Tyler Cowcn argues that reductions in productivity is a key factor that explains the
great recession. See generally, T yler Cowen, T he G reat Stagnation (2011); see also

2017]

T A K I NG S Y S T E M I C RI SK S E R I O U S L Y

1589

exist, and are so widespread in scope so as to affect the entire national (and,
potentially, international) economy, implies that a regulatory solution at the national
level is desirable.
In our model, then, we consider the bank’s systemic risk that it externalizes onto
the wider economy and allow the regulator to take this systemic risk into account
when deciding upon regulatory strategy. Specifically, we assume that the amount of
systemic risk (which is, for our purposes, the expected harm imposed on society by
the bank), which we denote as a function of the number of low- and high-risk projects
undertaken, R(l,h), is increasing in the actual portfolio risk of the bank and at an
increasing rate (formally, R">0, R " > 0 ) . That is, the marginal effect of each project
on overall systemic risk is increasing. Adding a project to a bank with few projects
has little effect on systemic risk, since the bank is relatively solvent in the event that
the project fails. In contrast, adding an additional project to an already heavily
invested bank may well be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and may go further
by causing losses at other banks and in the wider economy. One possibility, which
we discuss later on,122 is the possibility that activities at one bank affect the systemic
risk created by activities at another bank; for instance, an additional investment in
sub-prime mortgages creates more risk given that other banks are already heavily
invested in the area.
With this in mind, our regulator in the model may undertake any of several forms
of regulation with the goal of maximizing expected overall social welfare. This
includes the gains and losses of the shareholder, creditors, and the wider society— in
the form of systemic risk, R. We can make this problem somewhat simpler; given the
creditors’ investment, creditors’ expected losses are shareholders’ expected gains
given the expropriative nature of risk taking in this model. Hence, the regulator seeks
to maximize the sum of the bank’s expected profits less the systemic risk that bank
imposes on society.
We consider three classes of possible regulatory actions: ex post litigation and
insurance covergage, ex ante direct activity level restrictions, and ex post
intervention to shut down the bank's activities (at a cost) after shareholders and bank
managers have made their choices. An additional class of regulation—mandated
executive compensation characteristics—we leave to a future project, as it requires a
consideration of the more complicated agency cost problem.
B. How Do the Various Alternatives Fare?
In this section we consider the operation of our model firm and economy under
several modes of regulation, drawing from both the law and economics literature and
current modes of bank governnace.

Jeffrey A. Miron & Natalia Rigol, Bank Failures and Output During the Great Depression
(Nat’l Bureau o f Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19418, 2013), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w 19 4 18.pdf | https://perma.cc/.IJ5M-PW6Q].
122. See infra Part II.B.3.
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1. A Baseline: L aissez-faire
As a baseline, consider the laissez-faire case in w hich regulators do nothing,
allow ing private individuals or firm s to act in th eir own interest. T his approach has
som e appeal, relying, as it does, on private m arket participants to act on their own
inform ation according to their preferences. Shareholders, m anagers, creditors, and
counterparties m ake their own investm ent decisions to m axim ize private gains.
T he effectiveness o f this laissez-faire approach depends heavily, how ever, on
w hether there are any potential costs generated by the activity that are not fully
internalized by the individual or firm , and therefore not priced by the m arket. W ithout
an internalizing m echanism and in the presence o f Coasian transactions co sts,123
negative externality-generating products and activities will receive too much invest
ment. A polluting factory is the prototypical exam ple, since a factory that can force
local farm ers to bear som e o f the costs o f production will overproduce relative to the
social optim al. In this w ay, excessive bank activity leading to system ic risks can be
thought o f as a sort o f financial pollution.
G iven any level o f debt investm ent in the b ank’s capital, the shareholder w ill tend
to choose a higher level o f banking activity than is optim al. C onsider a specific case
w here the bank has FD IC -insured deposits o f $ 10, the shareholder has an endow m ent
o f $2, and the m arket rate o f return is 0% . T here are ten each o f high-risk and lowrisk projects available to the bank. Further, the shareholder know s that the first three
low- and high-risk projects carry w ith them an expected profit o f $0.20 (i.e., n , =
n h = 3, ni = n h = $0.20), and each low -risk project increases expected social costs
(in term s o f system ic risk) by $0.08, w hile each high-risk project increases expected
social costs by $0.16 (i.e., dR/dl = $0.08, dR/ dh = $0.16). In such a case, the social
optim um is attained by undertaking all six o f the profitable projects, w hich yields
aggregate returns to the bank’s shareholders and debtholders o f $1.20, and expected
costs due to system ic risk o f $0.72, for an overal social return o f $0.58.
U nfortunately, absent regulation o f som e sort, the shareholder will not undertake
the socially optim al set o f projects. In the event that the projects fail (and recall that,
by assum ption, they either all succeed or all fail), the shareholder w inds up w ith zero,
since the assets o f the bank will be insufficient to fully reim burse the creditors (here,
the F D IC ).1-4 T his m eans that the shareholder enjoys the upside on risky projects,
but is indifferent to the degree o f failure that the bank may experience. So, for the
first three low- and high-risk projects, the shareholder’s expected p ay o ff is 50% x
($2 + $0.20) = $1.10 and 50% x ($3 + $0.20) = $ 1.60 on each project, respectively.

123. A potential market solution, following Coase, is for those injured by the externality
to contraet with the injurer to refrain from the harmful conduet. See R. H. Coase, The Problem
o f Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (I960). In general, where benefits or harms are dispersed,
the large costs associated with collective action and contracting make market solutions o f this
sort unlikely. Further, such solutions typically rely on enforceable contracts.
124. One can verily this by noting that in the event o f failure, for any number of projects
undertaken that is greater than the equity investment (i.e., h + l > e), the revenues will be
insufficient to repay the full $10 of debt. And, clearly, the shareholder would, in these circum
stances, always choose to invest the full amount o f debt capital—the upside is essentially free
to the shareholder in this case; the choice of how much equity to contribute, in contrast, de
pends on the project parameters.
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For all other projects such that / + h < 10, the shareholder’s payoff is $1 and $1.50
for low- and high-risk projects, respectively. The hierarchy o f investment, then, is
the profitable high-risk projects (expected gross payoffs to the shareholder o f $ 1.60),
the nonprofitable high-risk projects ($1.50), the profitable low-risk projects ($1.10),
and, finally, the nonprofitable low-risk projects ($1). The shareholder will undertake
all ten high-risk projects and two o f the three low-risk profitable projects. The
shareholder’s expected net payoff from this is 3 x $1.60 + 7 x $1.50 + 2 x $1.10 —
$10 - $2 = $5.50. Overall social welfare is, however, negative, at 3 * $0.20 + 2 x
$0.20 - 10 x $0.16 - 2 x $0.08 = -$0.76.
Two things are apparent from this example. First, the shareholder will engage in
too much risk overall: even if all the profitable projects are used up, there is an
incentive to simply maximize the option value o f equity’s limited liability. Second,
because o f the shareholder’s benefit from risk, the shareholder may even choose to
pass up profitable projects in order to engage in unprofitable risk-seeking strategies.
2. Ex Post: Litigation and Insurance
Because banking is widely thought to generate significant negative externalities,
ex post litigation— analogous to tort causes o f action in the pollution context— is
available to force parties who act in socially costly ways to bear the costs o f doing
so. After the harm has been done, injured parties may sue to recover their losses from
the offending bank.125
Ex post litigation has the virtue o f keeping regulatory interference to a minimum
and avoiding decisions based on limited information, and is a common regulatory
option for that reason. For instance, to evaluate the social welfare o f the design of
nearly all consumer products, we use ex post litigation (that is, tort law) instead of
preapproval by government bureaucrats. This choice reflects the fact that the ex
pected costs o f preapproval (that is, decision costs plus error costs) are extremely
high in light o f the lack o f information held by regulators ex ante. Regulators do not
know, for instance, the products or features consumers will demand, the products
producers will be able to design and manufacture efficiently, or the social costs o f
products before they are made and used. In the banking context, while a regulator
may suspect that a financial firm ’s activities impose a social cost o f $10 approxi
mately half the time, absent other concerns, it would be preferable for the regulator
to simply wait to see whether the harm actually materializes, and o f what magnitude
it is, before assigning liability.
This is true in other areas o f financial regulation as well. Take securities law. For
many years, state laws, known as “ Blue Sky Laws,” authorized state securities
regulators to prescreen securities issued by private firms to see whether or not they
were reasonable investments for citizens o f the particular state.126 The information

125. For instance, in August 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $8.5 billion to settle a
suit brought by disappointed mortgage investors. Nelson Schwartz, Bank o f America Settle
ment Faces Growing Challenges, N.Y. T imes: DealBook (Aug. 30, 2011, 7:39 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/homeowners-scck-to-block-bank-of-amcrica-settlemcnl/ [https://
perma.ee/D6J5-Y56V].
126. See, eg.. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin o f the Blue Sky Laws, 70
T ex. L. Rf.v. 347, 348—49 (1991) (describing Blue Sky Laws and offering a public choice
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problem o f ex ante regulation is plain, since assessments about the riskiness o f a
security or a particular firm are famously difficult to make. The recent experiences
with the Internet stock bubble and the credit derivative bubble that led to the financial
crisis are ready examples o f the errors that can be made in trying to evaluate values
and risk ex ante. It was perhaps this problem that led to the New Deal Congress that
passed the federal securities laws to reject so-called “merit” regulation, relying on ex
post litigation (primarily on fraud and disclosure-related causes o f action) to give
issuers o f securities proper incentives.127 In addition, state merit regulation has
largely died,128 as the costs o f prescreening (that is, decision costs plus error costs)
are thought to be unnecessary, given the private incentives and availability o f ex post
sanctions.
There are two major shortcomings o f ex post liability. First, if the injured parties
are diffuse and have relatively small stakes, then the costs o f bringing a lawsuit may
be prohibitive. This is likely true in cases o f environmental harm, where many people
may be injured slightly by pollution, and in banking, where a bank failure may impact
thousands o f depositors. There are mechanisms for coordinating litigation and reduc
ing these costs, including class action litigation and government-brought cases. But
it may be more efficient to rely on ex ante regulation, such as limits on emissions,
cap and trade systems, or bans, depending on the economic, political, and practical
circumstances o f the particular case.
Second, the injurer must be able to pay any judgm ent in order to internalize the
social costs o f the activity. Where an actor is likely to be bankrupt when the injury
occurs, or be bankrupted by the injury, the actor will not expect to bear the full costs
o f the injury, and will therefore engage in a supra-optimal level o f the injuring activ
ity. The problem is often more acute when the harming party is a firm: shareholders,
who are protected by limited liability, may prefer projects with high insolvency risks,
since the shareholder has, effectively, an option to purchase the firm ’s cash flows for
the price o f the outstanding debt. Hence, in industries where the risks are great and
losses are often very large, as in pharmaceuticals and banking, we expect tort liability
to be displaced or complemented by other regulation.
Judgment proofness is clearly a problem in our banking model. The firm will be
insolvent and unable to pay creditors and injured third parties in the event o f severe
financial injury to others. While presumably the FD1C would be able to sue for its
losses, and the federal government would similarly be able to attach assets to cover
bailout or other such taxpayer costs, this will generally happen too late, after the bank
has gone bust. In the numerical example above, for instance, the bank undertakes ten
high-risk and two low-risk projects. In the event that the bank goes bust, the bank’s
net assets will be the 5 x $0.20 = $1 produced by the five profitable projects (three

explanation for their passage).
127. For a discussion of the regulatory choices and environment surrounding the passage
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see Joel Seligman,
T he T ransformation of Wall Street 39-123 (3d ed. 2003).
128. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 amended section 18 of the
Securities Act of 1933 to preempt state Blue Sky Laws regarding a specific class of “covered
securities,” including securities traded on national exchanges. National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78 (2012)).
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high-risk and tw o low -risk) less the 10 x -$1 = —$ 10 losses caused by the failure o f
the ten high-risk projects, for a net value o f -$ 9 . A bsent the problem o f FDIC
insurance, this w ould not be all too concerning, as creditors w ould have bargained
for either controls or an interest rate that gives them an expectation o f at least
breaking even. In addition, how ever, the bank will have generated $1.76 in expected
costs due to increased system ic risk— w hich, when realized, could be much higher.
T he bank, now insolvent, is clearly in no position to repay either its tort or contractual
creditors.
O ne com m on regulatory response to the judgm ent-proofness problem is to require
in surance.129 T he regulator can m andate that the potential bad actor pay prem ium s to
a regulated interm ediary, w ho in return guarantees the acto r’s specified liabilities.130
A nother option is to require bonding by the firm. The regulator can require the actor
to set aside m oney or assets in a segregated account that can be attached in the event
o f subsequent injury to o th ers.131 E ither m easure am ounts to a precom m itm ent by the
insured or bonder to pay future judgm ents, at least up to a specified am ount. Bonding
im poses costs directly on the actor, w hile insurance requires oversight by the insurer
to prom ote optim al behavior; the insurance actuarial process ideally takes into ac
count bank activities in setting prem ium s and extending coverage, such that banks
have an ex ante incentive to prom ote social w ell-bein g .1’2
U nfortunately, in the banking context, insurance m ay be ineffective due to the
correlation o f failures am ong firm s.133 Indeed, precisely because it is system ic risk
that provokes concern about bank collapses, private insurers are unlikely to be able
to provide m eaningful protection. Insurance w orks by aggregating risks across the
insured, so that the costs incurred by one party can be dispersed across the entire pool
o f insureds. But if financial firm s engage in sim ilar projects w ith the sam e risk pro
files, then all firm s will face insolvency risk at the sam e tim e. We have assum ed in
our m odel perfect correlation am ong projects, so that all firm s will be insolvent at
the sam e tim e .134 In such a case, insurance will not have any im pact on firm risk
taking. W hile the perfect correlation assum ption is clearly unrealistic, we still reach
the qualitatively sam e result with regard to insurance, so long as a significant degree
o f correlation exists am ong the projects, and so long as the potential injuries are large.

129. For a discussion and economic analysis of such policies, see Steven Shavell, The
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int ’l . Rev . L. & Econ. 45, 54-55 (1986).
130. The regulator need not be the government, since a self-regulatory organization may
do this by using a centralized third-party clearinghouse to achieve the same result.
131. The leading treatment of this issue is found in Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset
Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Prob
lem, 36 Ra n d J. Econ . 63 (2005).
132. FDIC insurance is only weakly linked to risk because o f the danger o f self-fulfilling
prophecy. Risk-based premiums are provided in 12 U.S.C. (j 1817(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012), and
regulations arc set forth in 12 C.F.R.
327.9-327.10 (2016).
133. It is not clear that even the FDIC could adequately cover a single large bank failure.
In the WaMu failure, for instance, the FDIC arguably rushed WaMu into receivership due to
concern over the ability to fully insure its deposits in an abysmal failure. Jason Zasky, The
Failure o f WaMu, Failure (Aug. 2, 2012), http://failuremag.com/feature/article/the_failure
of wamu/ [https://perma.ee/KHH5-QJUZ] (interview describing FDIC concerns).
134. Perfect correlation means that firm risk increases linearly in the number of projects;
independence would mean that firm risk increases in the square root of the number of projects.
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U nder m ore realistic assum ptions in the m odel, when one financial firm experiences
failure due to system ic risk, so will m any others; insuring system ic events such as
this is often beyond the scope o f private insurers.
T he intuition behind this result is borne out to som e extent by recent experience
with the failure o f financial firm s. W hile insurance for default risk in banking does
exist in the form of, am ong other things, credit default sw aps, system ic events may
lead to industry-w ide (and econom y-w ide) failures and catastrophic loss am ounts.
T his happened, for instance, with A m erican International G roup (A1G) credit default
sw aps w ritten as protection on m ortgage-backed securities; not only did certain bank
assets fail, but m uch o f A IG ’s asset portfolio declined in value as w ell.135 Insurance
in this instance w as w oefully ineffective to properly incentivize firm s, and the com 
m on narrative is now that insurers them selves expected strategic ju d g m en t proofness
to w ork in their fav o r.136
3. Ex A nte Regulation: Size and A sset T ype R estrictions
G iven the failures— both theoretical and, apparently, real— o f both litigation and
insurance in governing bank behavior, som e additional m ethod o f regulation is
necessary. We turn our attention now to several variations on w hat w e generically
term ex ante bank regulation— activity restrictions o f various sorts— w hich constrain
either the am ount o f banking activity that a firm may undertake or else the sorts o f
projects available to the firm.
A nalogizing to other industries, activity restrictions are sim ilar to com m and-andcontrol regulation, w here experienced bureacrats prescribe m andatory best practices
for the firm . C om m and-and-control is m ost com m only found in areas o f relatively
slow developm ent o f products and technologies, and w here inform ational asym m e
tries betw een regulators and firm s are low. For exam ple, in stable industries, like
energy utilities, the costs and benefits o f the activities are w ell know n, and the
am ount o f innovation is relatively sm all (putting aside the concern that low innova
tion results from the degree and form o f regulation). Energy producers rarely produce
new products, and regulators can reasonably estim ate the future social costs and
benefits o f activities based on historical experience. Such ju d g m en ts are m ade on the
basis o f rigorous cost-benefit analysis, as it is relatively straightforw ard to estim ate
w ith som e scientific precision the im pacts o f regulations on individuals and firm s.
T he EPA can therefore be relatively confident that by lim iting firm activities in
particular w ays it is not causing underproduction (or allow ing overproduction) o f
valuable products and services. T he EPA m ight, for instance, m andate a cap on
particulate em issions from a particular sort o f factory, as well as prescribe production

135. See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World o f Risky Debt, 123 H arv.
L. R ev. 1151, 1152 (2010). While Squire writes that AIG would not necessarily have been
insolvent based solely on the policies it wrote, its assets (largely placed in real estate) declined
significantly in value at the time o f the banking crisis, id. at 1194-98.
136. For instance, the International Association o f Insurance Supervisors issued a position
statement on the financial crisis noting that the insurance industry itself is susceptible to sys
temic risk. Int’l A ss’n of Ins. S upervisors, Position Statement on Key Financial
Stability Issues (2010), http://www.iaisweb.0rg/pagc/ncws/other-papcrs-and-reports//f1le
/34040/iais-posilion-statement-on-key-financial-stability-issues [https://perma.cc/7D6P-UCQ5].
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methods, effectively limiting production to a set specification based on extensive
knowledge o f the products created and the harms imposed by those emissions.
This ex ante regulatory approach is, however, o f questionable efficacy in fastevolving areas such as technology or structured finance, where the costs and benefits
o f new products are likely much more difficult to determine in advance. Finance also
contains many dispersed heterogeneous innovators, producers, and consumers, again
unlike centralized energy production. It is perhaps for this reason that cost-benefit
analysis— at least as rigorously practiced by regulators like the EPA— has
historically not been a part o f the regulation o f securities and other financial
products.1’7
This points to a general drawback o f activity level and other forms o f command
and control regulation: the level o f overall social welfare is constrained by what the
regulator knows at the time o f creating the regulatory structure. As such, ex ante
regulation fails to take account o f valuable information held by the firms, by the
consumers, and by the regulator after observing production and usage for some time.
This may mean that the activity level regulation inefficiently constrains production
to a suboptimal level, as in the case where the regulator overestimates the costs or
underestimates the benefits o f the activity. Or, quite the opposite, this may mean that
the activity level regulation is not strict enough.
An additional problem o f being the first mover is regulation will necessarily have
to be designed to anticipate behavior, and this means that behavior can be adjusted
to avoid the regulation. Loopholes may be gameable by the firm; firms may simply
switch from the proscribed means o f production into more harmful or less efficient
ones. When a firm ’s first-choice project becomes more costly due to regulation, the
firm may switch to a second-choice project, which may be done with increased risk
in order to boost returns to be similar to the first-best project.
The use o f credit derivatives is an example o f this sort o f regulatory arbitrage.
Capital adequacy rules require banks to hold capital in reserve, based on a risk
calculation. In order to free up capital, banks engage in risk-transferring contracts
known as credit derivatives. Banks make loans for mortgages, for instance, and then
transfer some o f the risk o f the mortgage to other investors. This allows them to hold
less cash in reserve. For example, a loan o f $100 would be packaged with other loans
in a special-purpose entity, and then interests in the portfolio o f loans would be sold
to investors. In this way, the bank could make new loans without holding cash in
reserve for the original loans.1’8

137. The D.C. Circuit recently reversed and remanded a SIX' rule regarding shareholder
access to the corporate proxy on grounds that the SEC did not engage in cost-benefit analysis
of the rule. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Thereafter, the
House passed a bill that would have mandated the SEC to do cost-benefit analysis for every
rule. See Andrew Ackerman, House Lawmakers Pass SEC Cost-Benefit Bill, Wall St . J. (May
17, 2013,4:27 PM) http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1000142412788732476700457848
9410238066202 [https://perma.cc/WR8K-HGT9]. The bill went no further.
138. See Mishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 336—40, for a brief overview of mortgagebacked securities practices.
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a. Firm Size Limits
Despite these general drawbacks, several recent proposals for bank regulation
involve some form of preset activity limitation. These include proposals to limit the
size of banks, restrict leverage or balance sheet growth, impose taxes on financial
transactions, and limit the financial products that may be made available, as a form
of financial “FDA.” We consider these now in turn.
A common proposal to constrain bank behavior is to simply limit the size of
banks. For instance, economist and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has
written that “the only way to make sure no bank it [sic] too big to fail is to make sure
no bank is too big.” 139 Several academics and banking observers have also proposed
concrete limits on bank size.140 These proposals are based on a common sense view
that if banks are constrained from growing their balance sheets, the level of risk
undertaken by any individual bank will be smaller.
From the analysis of the shareholder’s decision in the absence of regulation,141 we
know that shareholders will have the bank engage in too much activity in general. In
our model, shareholders will generally prefer more banking activity than regulators;
therefore, any limit set by the regulator will likely bind. In such a case, the regulator
chooses activity level limit a, which is the maximum number of projects that a firm
can undertake, with the expectation that the limit will be binding; the size of the
firm’s balance sheet will then be a.
An obvious problem is that the regulator does not observe the realization of either
the number of profitable projects (n; and nh), or the level of profitability of those
projects (nl and nh). So, for purposes of setting size limits, the regulator relies simply
on the distribution of those variables, which we assume to be common knowledge.
The greater the variance of these distributions, the less likely it is the regulator’s rule
will be helpful, and the expected social welfare will be lower. The shareholder knows
the realizations of these variables, but because o f her conflicting incentives, simply
telling the regulator these values is not credible. This basic problem—the limited
knowledge of the regulator acting before activity is undertaken— is a general
problem with ex ante bank regulation of all forms.
Consider also the bank’s and shareholder’s incentive given a size limit of a.
Returning to our numerical example above, suppose that the regulator limits banks
to a balance sheet size of $6. This happens to correspond to the number of profitable
projects available to the bank (recall that n, = nh = 3, nL= n h = $0.20). But this does
not mean that the bank will invest in only profitable projects; to the contrary, the
bank will choose to undertake six high-risk projects, only three of which are
profitable, leaving aside the three profitable low-risk projects. What the size
restriction has done, in this case, is simply to drive the bank into exclusively highrisk projects. We think that this is likely to be a problem in the real world: banks who
are constrained in the size of their balance sheets have incentives to get more bang

139. Robert Reich, Break Up the Banks: Why We Must Limit the Size o f Bants, C hristian
Sci. Monitor (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Robert-Reich/2010/0406
/Break-up-the-banks-Why-we-must-limit-the-size-of-banks | https://perma.cc/264D-Z3ZG].
140. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 26. at 1372-73, and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part ll.B.l.
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for their buck, in the form o f higher risk projects, even if those projects are not
socially desirable.
There are yet other reasons to think that this approach is highly inefficient. Partly
this is because limits on firm size are, by design, a one-size-fits-all solution. Our
model assumes one representative bank. In reality, though, firms are, o f course,
different, and some firms may have many more profitable projects than others;
management may be better, for instance, or the opportunities open to that bank may
simply be o f higher quality. In terms o f our model, if we add more banking firms and
allow 7i;, n h, 7T(, and n h to vary across firms, the regulator’s one size fits all rule is
necessarily imperfect— even in the case o f perfect information. Putting this in the
context o f the real world, it may well be that some banks are justified in being quite
big, while other poorly run banks ought to remain quite small.
The nature o f systemic risk, and how it evolves over time across the banking
sector, presents another problem with ex ante regulation. The regulator may receive
subsequent information about both the profitability o f the firm and the systemic harm
that the firm is likely to impose. This is especially true for systemic risk, where the
likelihood o f a systemic event depends upon what other banks and financial firms
are doing and is something that the regulator is uniquely situated to observe. For
instance, in a two-bank world, if Bank 1 is heavily invested in subprime real estate,
but Bank 2 is not, Bank 1 likely carries far less systemic risk than in the
counterfactual case where Bank 2 holds highly identical assets on its balance sheet.
This issue o f similar asset holdings across banks suggests an additional
shortcoming o f size limits. If the sum o f expected systemic harm across banks— R in
our model— is a function o f the sum o f all projects undertaken, then the number of
banks into which those projects are divided is meaningless. The rationale o f size
limits assumes that projects abandoned by one bank, as it hits its asset limit, will not
simply be picked up by additional banks— that is, there are a fixed number o f banks,
such that size limits really do limit overall banking activity. If new banks simply take
on those projects, then the industry-aggregated bank balance sheet and portfolio
correlation is unchanged. Suppose, for example, that in the absence o f regulation,
Bank 1 would undertake 100 projects, imposing an expected cost o f $100,000 on
society. If the regulator limits Bank 1 to only 50 projects, and no other banks arise
or capitalize on the foregone projects, the regulator has successfully limited risk. If
instead, however, Bank 2 is formed to snatch up the remaining 50 projects, there is
no reason to think that the overall expected costs and benefits imposed on society
will be any different than in the unregulated case with only Bank 1. They are, after
all, the exact same projects, separated only by the corporate fiction. Unless there is
something significant with regard to the particular corporate shell itself that houses
the assets,142 then size limits will do little to prevent opportunistic risk taking. While
a convincing account o f systemic risk is required to definitively answer whether
cabining projects in separate corporate shells alleviates systemic risk, no such
account exists; until one is provided, we think size limits are unlikely to help.

142. It is conceivable that there are significant real differences to having the same number
of assets in one bank as opposed to spread homogeneously across two banks. For instance,
Reich suggests that larger banks have economics of scale in buying off politicians and regulators,
suggesting that “too big to fail” is really a product of public choice. Reich, supra note 139.
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b. Prudential Regulation and Capital Adequacy Requirements
One of the primary ways in which banks are currently regulated is by setting a
limit on the amount of banking activity that can be undertaken relative to the amount
of shareholders’ equity. Such principles are embodied in the capital adequacy ratios
under the Basel Accords discussed above.14’ Supposing, for instance, that the
regulator mandated a capital adequacy ratio of 8% (as is required under Basel),144 a
bank with shareholder equity of $100 million would be allowed to engage in only up
to $1.25 billion of financial activity. If the bank or its shareholders wished to engage
in more activity, they would have to raise more equity capital.
This type of prudential regulation is designed to protect the firm’s creditors. A
required equity cushion based on the amount of debt helps assure creditors that they
do not take on more risk than initially contemplated. It also gives equity investors
some downside, which may reduce risk taking to an extent. The problem, however,
is that prudential regulation of this sort does little to protect those outside of the firm
and to prevent large amounts of risk-taking activity.
Return to our numerical example from Part II.B.l. Suppose our shareholder has
put $0.87 in the bank. Under an 8% capital adequacy ratio requirement, the equity
holder can maintain up to $10 in debt, which gives a maximum activity level of
$ 10.87.145 The shareholder can, if she wishes, engage in more financial activity; all
that is required is that she commit more o f her own money. This is true whether or
not the activity in question is socially benefica! or costly. The question that must be
asked of prudential regulation is: will she commit such another dollar, even if
additional investment is unproductive and only increases risk?
The answer, unfortunately, is yes, given that the increase in risk is large enough.
If there is an additional high-risk project available (recall that these cost $ 1 and return
$3 or -$ ! with even odds), the shareholder’s net increase in expected payoffs from
adding this project is $0.50.146 This is so even though the project is not, in
expectation, profitable, and even though it increases expected social costs by $0.16.
In contrast, if all that were available were an additional unprofitable low-risk project,
then the shareholder would be indifferent, since her net return from the investment
is zero.
It is also worth noting which projects will be abandoned as capital adequacy ratios
tighten. Suppose the regulator tightens the capital adequacy ratio from 8% to 30%.
Given the shareholder’s endowment of $2, the maximum possible size o f the bank is
$6.67—so which projects will the shareholder choose to abandon? The hierarchy of
projects abandoned would be low-risk unprofitable projects, low-risk profitable
projects, high-risk unprofitable projects, and high-risk profitable projects, in that
order. Hence, a tightening of capital requirements may lead to a greater equity
investment and more high-risk investment—or it could lead to an abandonment of
low-risk projects and a flight into high-risk ones. One thing it does lead to is less
banking. Consider the extreme case: even in an all-equity bank (a capital adequacy

143. See supra Part I.B.2.
144. See Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), supra note 74.
145. $.87 divided by 8% equals approximately $ 10.87.
146. Recall that, in the event of success, the shareholder will keep the gains in excess of
the debt outstanding, while in a failure the shareholder simply walks away with $0.
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ratio requirem ent o f 100%), the shareholder m ay still take excessive risks from a
societal perspective. W hat changes is that the size o f the bank w ill be sm aller: the
bank funded only by the shareholder’s $2 endow m ent w ill be able to m ake only $2
o f loans (in high-risk projects, o f course). T he overall risk level may be low er even
though average project risk is higher; w hat this m eans is that the level o f lending has
contracted enorm ously, as has the m oney supply. N either o f these outcom es is good
for the econom y.
Risk w eighting may alleviate som e o f these problem s. C urrently, how ever, the
gradation o f risk w eighting is sufficiently coarse that it does not account for such
differences am ong assets. For exam ple, a bank issuing a high-yield and high-risk
com m ercial loan w ould receive the sam e risk w eighting as a low -yield, low -risk
com m ercial loan o f the sam e term . N or does Basel III m ake distinctions am ong
quality o f hom e loans or am ong trading positions o f sim ilar m atu rities.147
This is not to say that capital adequacy rules are w ithout value. W hat such
requirem ents do is keep the shareholders from expropriating the firm ’s debt holders.
Every dollar that the shareholder puts in, keeping the assets constant, is a dollar that
cushions the depositors and other creditors in the event o f a loss. M inim um capital
rules may help m itigate losses otherw ise borne by creditors and the FDIC, but they
will do little to prevent excessive bank activities that generate system ic risk or other
social harms. Such a rule m akes sense given FDIC insurance (w hich renders
depositors indifferent to banking risk), but it is a costly form o f risk lim itation.
c. Financial Transaction Taxes
A tax is often preferable to a direct lim it on activity. Pigovian taxes, in w hich tax
rates for goods and services are tied to their expected social cost, can be a useful
m echanism for forcing actors to internalize the costs o f their b eh av io r.148 For
exam ple, autom obile use leads to externalities in the form o f pollution and
congestion. W hile one approach w ould be to lim it the am ount o f driving that people
may do, the hours at w hich driving m ay occur, or the num ber and type o f cars that
can be sold, such a m andate w ould fail to take into account private inform ation about
costs and benefits and, even with perfect inform ation, w ould fail to satisfy
heterogeneous tastes and needs.
A better approach m ay be to im pose a tax upon autom obile usage or gasoline
consum ption, w ith the tax level set at the level o f externality. If the tax is set at
exactly the externality level, then even individual users w ill m ake socially optim al
ch o ices.149 W hile there may be som e conceivable heterogeneity in externalized costs

147. For a summary of the Basel III rules, see Davis Polk, U.S. Basel III F inal R ule:
V isual M emorandum, (2013), http://www.translegalstudies.org/symposium_20l4/materials
/Panel_l/Panel%201%20CLE%20_U.S.Basel.III.Final.Rule.VisuaI.Memo%2006.09.2013%
20Davis%20Polk%20WardwelI%20LLP.pdf [https://perma.ee/7N9A-DJZB].
148. For an overview of Pigovian taxes, see Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm fo r
Pigovian Taxes, 68 Vand . L. R ev . 1673, 1682-90 (2015).
149. This approach, known as Pigovian taxation, has broad appeal among economists for
precisely these reasons. Economist Greg Mankiw started the “Pigou Club” to collect the names
of economists who support a broader use of Pigovian taxes. Greg Mankiw, Rogoff Joins the
Pigou Club, G reg Mankiw ’s B log (Sept. 6, 2006), hllp://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006
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among end users, such differences are likely quite small relative to the common and
uniform costs imposed (such as carbon dioxide emissions) by burning a gallon of
gasoline. Such an approach is likely superior to the command-and-control approach
or the no-reguation case.
So, then, by analogy, if financial transactions lead to systemic risk in the same
way that gasoline consumption leads to pollution, a tax on financial transactions
might make sense. In 2009, the Speaker of the House proposed such a tax,150 and
France recently imposed one to apply not only in France but on all transactions
involving French firms, including American Depositary Receipt (ADRs) of French
companies traded in the United States.151 The idea, which originated with John
Maynard Keynes, is to reduce risk taking by taxing marginal trades on the belief that
these are more likely to be based on “speculation” instead of “investment.” 152
But, there are some clear problems with such an approach, as the foregoing
analysis of activity level limits suggests. As with other forms of ex ante regulation,
the regulator must have a great deal of information available to it about the projects
profitably available to each bank in order to set a reasonable tax rate. Setting the tax
level too high prevents socially beneficial transactions, while setting the tax too low
allows too much risky banking activity. There may also be a problem, again, with
bank heterogeneity: if different banks have different sorts of opportunities with
differnet risk profiles, then a one-size-fits-alI approach will tend to punish banks
whose activities carry little inherent risk and reward ones whose activities are of
above-average riskiness. Proposed taxes attempt to differentiate among activities
with, for example, different rates o f tax for transactions in each of stocks, bonds, and
derivatives.
This brings us to the fundamental problem of a transactions tax: the number of
financial transactions or projects is a flawed proxy for systemic risk created by the
entire bank portfolio. Such a tax may then be ineffective, or even have perverse
effects, pushing banks into overall riskier transactions. The reason is that higher-risk
projects, which carry higher payoffs for the shareholder, are more likely to remain
profitable under a tax regime.
Consider again our simple model. The bank is financed with equity of e = $.80
and FDIC-insured deposits of $0.20 such that the bank can engage in one project.
The bank faces a choice between one high-risk and one low-risk project (recall that
all projects are essentially coin flips, paying $3/—$ 1 and $2/$0 for high- and low-risk

/09/rogoff-joins-pigou-club.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ98-N4KX].
150. Thomas Ferraro & Andy Sullivan, Wall Street Tax “Has a Great Deal o f Merit”:
Pelosi, Reuters (Dec. 3,2009, 12:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/03/us-usa
-congress-tax-idUSTRE5B24J520091203 | https://perma.ee/2C2P-MRYV].
151. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Wall St. Tax, a Simple Idea but Unintended Conse
quences, N.Y. Times: D ealbook (Feb. 26, 2013, 5:20 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2013/02/26/in-wall-street-tax-a-simple-idea-with-uninlended-consequences [https://perma.ee
/P2MA-W5QC],
152. The idea for such a financial tax goes back to at least 1936, when John Maynard
Keynes proposed it as a curb on excessive speculation. Stephen S pratt, A Sterling
Solution : Implementing a Stamp D uty on Sterling To F inance International
Development 15-16 (2006), www.stampoutpoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/A
-Sterling-Solution.pdf [https://peima.ee/94F.Y-38BV].
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projects, respectively, plus profitability n). Suppose that the high-risk project is not
profitable ( n h = 0), and that the low-risk project is profitable (n ( = 1), with expected
profitability o f n L = $0.65. Finally, the expected systemic harm from the high-risk
project is $0.16, while that from the low-risk project is $0.08.
Without the tax and under a laissez-faire system, the bank will invest in the
profitable low-risk project and eschew the unprofitable high-risk one. Expected
returns from underaking the low-risk project are 50% x ($0.65 - $0.20) + 50% x
($2.65 - $0.20) - $0.80 = $0.65. Expected returns from undertaking the high-risk
project are 50% x $0 + 50% x ($3 - $0.20) —$0.80 = $0.60, which is lower. In this
case, the laissez-faire system achieves the social optimum, since the low-risk project
has private returns to the shareholder o f $0.65, no externalization to counterparties
or depositors, and systemic externalized costs o f $0.08, for a net benefit o f $0.57.
Undertaking the high-risk project, in contrast, would have private shareholder
benefits o f $0.60, expected losses to counterparties o f $0.50, expected losses to
depositors (the FDIC) o f $0.10, and externalized systemic costs o f $0.16, for a net
societal loss o f $0.16.
Now, suppose the regulator attempts to be a good Pigovian by imposing a tax
equal to the average systemic externality o f projects, which in this case would be
$0.12 per transaction. Perversely, this causes the bank to switch from the profitable
low-risk project to the unprofitable high-risk project, making society worse off.
Consider first the shareholder’s expected payoffs to the low-risk project, which are
lowered by the full value o f the tax because o f the bank’s continued solvency given
either success or failure: 50% x ($.65 - $0.12 - $0.20) + 50% x ($2.65 - $0.12 $0.20) — $0.80 = $0.53. The high-risk project, on the other hand, allows the
shareholder to escape the incidence o f tax in the failed state o f the world: 50% x 0 +
50% x ($3 - $.12 - $.20) - $0.8 = $0.54. Payoffs to the high-risk project are now
higher for the shareholder (by a penny), causing the bank to switch under the tax
regime to the high-risk project. Social welfare is now $ 0 .5 4 - $ 0 .1 0 - $ 0 .5 6 - $ .1 6 +
$0.12 - - $ 0 .1 6 .153 Not only did the tax actually increase systemic risk, but it caused
the loss o f a profitable project. The total welfare loss under the tax regime is $0.70
relative to the laissez-faire state.
A somewhat more general failing o f a financial transactions tax is that the private
payoffs are increasing in the degree o f externality created. Unless the tax can be
calibrated to the actual risk created, imposing a tax only deters small risks with small
payoffs; larger risks are relatively undeterred. For example, suppose 7r; = n h = $ 0 .10
for all projects, while the systemic externalities o f the low- and high-risk projects are
given, respectively, by dR/ dl = $0.08 and d R / d h = $0.16. This means that low-risk
projects are socially desirable, while high-risk projects are not. Now apply a Pigovian
tax o f $0.16 per transaction. Because the high-risk project provides ample upside to
the shareholder, high-risk projects will be undeterred, even in an all-equity bank.154

153. The left-hand side of the equation is, in order: the shareholder’s expected private bene
fit, the depositor’s (FDIC’s) expected loss, the expected externalities borne by counterparties,
the expected systemic harm, and the amount of tax collected by the government.
154. The shareholder’s before-tax expected payoff in an all-equity bank undertaking the
high-risk project would be 50% * ($0) + 50% * ($3.10) - $1 = $0.55.
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Low-risk projects will, however, not be undertaken, since the upside is simply too
low to make up for the tax.155
For a financial transactions tax to work well, the regulator would have to link the
tax directly to the expected social costs in each case, including costs put onto
creditors and counterparties. These may all vary project by project and bank by bank.
This level of granularity puts huge informational demands on the tax setter and
largely defeats the point of a Pigovian tax in the first place.
d. Command-and-Control—a Financial FDA
As discussed above, part of the reason activity level limits and financial
transactions taxation will not work is due to the heterogeneity of projects, and the
fact that private rewards may often be correlated with externalized harms. Taking
that into account, some proposals call for treating different sorts of financial
transactions differently, perhaps allowing some and prohibiting others based on their
cost-benefit tradeoffs. This sort of command-and-control approach is analagous, for
instance, to U.S. regulation of energy production, where some forms of production
are mandated or prohibited, or to regulation of new medical drugs, where a testing
and approval process is necessary before new drugs may be marketed. This analogy
is, in fact, explicitly used in a proposal by professors Glen Wyel and Eric Posner for
a “financial FDA.” They recommend financial products be approved before they can
be sold, with the goal of eliminating or reducing needlessly speculatve (that is, risky)
transactions that regulators believe will impose significant social costs.156
A potential stumbling block to this approach is that it is dubious that regulators
can successfully identify, ex ante, which sorts of transactions impose unreasonable
risks and little benefit. Finance is a fast-evolving world where new products and
markets arise constantly; keeping regulators up to speed on new developments would
require an army of quantitative PhDs in financial economics to thoroughly analyze
every new financial instrument. Indeed, given that the systemic risk depends on what
other firms throughout the economy do, preapproval even with the requisite
manpower is a dubious proposition. As noted above, it is unlikely that any type of
transaction is socially dangerous in the abstract, instead depending heavily on the
quality of the bank engaging in the transaction, how many transactions the entire
banking system is making (that is, the total activity level), and the correlation of risk
across transactions. Unlike the regulation of drugs, where the risk to the individual
consuming the drug is based solely on whether and how much of the drug the
indiviudal takes, here, the risks for the bank and the banking sector cannot be
estimated in a vacuum or for an individual bank, but rather must be determined based
on the choices and practices of hundreds, if not thousands, of other actors.
Even assuming that riskier projects may be identified ex ante, a financial FDA
cannot be a complete solution. The reason is that the same level of portfolio risk may
be constructed in different ways; if very risky instruments are outlawed, a firm may

155. The shareholder’s before-tax expected payoff in an all-equity bank undertaking the
low-risk project would be 50% x ($(). | ()) + 50% x ($2.10) —$ 1 =$0.10.
156. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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be able to create the same overall portfolio characteristics with an agglomeration of
lower-risk instruments.
Returning to our model, suppose that a bank has available to it both high- and
low-risk investments, with a $1 equity investment by the shareholder. If the bank
invests in a high-risk project, its possible returns will be either $3 or —$1, each with
probability 50%; expected payoffs to the shareholder are $0.50. Suppose now that
high-risk projects are prohibited under a financial FDA approach. Can the bank
recreate the overall portfolio? Certainly—the bank can raise $1 in deposits and invest
in two low-risk projects. This yields exactly the same risk-return profile as one highrisk project: in the good state, the bank has gross returns of $4, of which it must pay
$1 back to its depositors; while in the bad state, the bank has $0 and owes its
depositors $1. The shareholder’s expected return is the same, $0.50. Even though the
financial FDA has prohibited the high-risk project, little has changed.1”
This is just a specific example of a more general point: modern financial
instruments can create any risk-return combination in countless ways that defy easy
categorization. A common illustration of this point is the concept of put-call parity.158
Using a mix of traditional and derivative products, any given asset return can be
artifically created by combining different types of financial products, including
buying assets, buying derivatives, borrowing, lending, and so on. In other words,
whatever the financial FDA outlaws can likely be recreated through some
combination of alternative financial instruments. The nimbleness of investors at
avoiding regulation arises in other areas of law as well, where traditional categories
of securities ownership have become increasingly problematic.159
We think it likely that banning particular instruments would do much good. The
financial industry has been particuarly adept at regulatory arbitrage. As a poignant
example, the multi-trillion dollar market for credit derivatives arose in part because
regulations prevented certain entities, like insurance companies, from making certain
types of investments.160

157. Who bears the loss is different in the two cases. In the low-risk ease, the bank must
raise deposits to purchase the two projects. With the high-risk project, no deposits need be
raised, and the subsequent losses are borne by the trading counterparty. Given the
conventional-wisdom assumption that neither depositors nor trading counterparties adequately
protect their positions from credit risk, this difference may not be material.
158. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Tricing o f Options and Corporate Liabili
ties, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637, 649-54 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory o f Rational Option Pric
ing., 4 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 141, 141-42 (1973); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Con
tract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 UARV. L. Rev. 460, 465-70 (1993).
159. Such issues arise elsewhere in the law, such as bankruptcy, tax, and corporate transac
tions. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 Yale L.J.
648 (2010).
160. State law generally prohibited insurance companies from investing in debt with a
rating of less than a certain credit rating, say AAA. This cut off insurance companies from
most of the corporate debt market, until financial innovators developed mechanisms for
generating what they thought was AAA-rated debt out of the debt of many companies with
lower credit ratings. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives are Not “Insurance, ”
16 C onn . Ins. L.J. 1 (2009); see also, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 1402(a) (McKinney 2015); 3
N ational A ssociation of Insurance Commissioners, Model Law , R egulations,
G uidelines (2009) (describing risk-based capital levels).
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Put another way, the failing of a financial FDA is that it does not focus on overall
portfolio risk. To do so, the financial FDA would need some complementary
regulation, such as an activity level limit. For instance, if the regulator both
proscribed high-risk projects and limited the bank to just one project in total, the
regulator would successfully limit aggregate risk. At the very least, the regulator’s
task will be more information-intensive than simply identifying a black list of
prohibited instruments. Rather, the regulator must come up with a way to prohibit
certain types of overall portfolios.
What this analysis suggests is that it is not enough to identify highly risky
activities: lower-risk activities must be appropriately moderated as well, since they
can be combined, either directly or synthetically, to create higher-risk activities.
Thus, even if the regulator is able to observe, ex ante, high-risk financial products,
in order to impose meaningful limitations on social risk, the regulator must also be
able to observe the productivity of each sort of transaction and set activity levels
accordingly, across all actors in the financial system. It would be pointless, for
instance, to disallow synthetic collateralized debt obligations (known as CDOs) and
the credit default swaps that back them,161 and yet allow accumulation of mortgages
that may yield the same risky exposures. Given the innumerable permutations into
which these sorts of financial instruments may be arranged, the financial FDA will
have less information about these synthetic combinations and techniques ex ante than
it will after observing them in practice. Overall, it may pay to wait.
4. A Middle Ground: The Regulatory Veto
The foregoing discussion of potential banking regulatory techniques reveals a
general problem with all extant and proposed regulations: ex ante limits on the
amount or sort of banking activity that may be undertaken are likely to be either
ineffective at limiting risk or, if effective, costly because the regulator makes policy
largely in the dark. Not regulating appears to be a poor option as well, since litigation
and insurance will fail to constrain risk-taking activity due to problems of judgment
proofness. The problem, then, is that it is not tenable to wait until harm actually oc
curs, but neither is it workable to regulate ex ante what banks can and cannot do.
Fortunately, there is something of an intermediate solution in what we have
termed the regulatory veto. Under the regulatory veto, the regulator does act to con
strain banking activity, but operates after more information is gained by observing
firm and customer choices, as well as getting better estimates of social losses. By
refraining from ex ante regulation, the regulator avoids proscribing harmless or even
beneficial activities; by retaining the right to observe the bank’s activities and to shut
down the bank before actual harm has been incurred, the regulator can maintain
meaningful deterrence and avoid problems of judgment proofness.
While this appears to be a great advantage of the regulatory veto, and we think
explains its existence, any theory of the regulatory veto must consider why it is that

161. This is, to an extent, what Congress has done in the Dodd-Frank Act. See James
Spindler, Making the Next Financial Crisis Worse, One Regulation at a Time, Forbes
(Oct. 5, 2011, 1:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2011/10/05/making-the-next
-fmancial-crisis-worse-one-regulation-at-a-time/#a8371217204a lhttps://perma.cc/SEL4-LNMY]
(describing the problems with the SEC release on synthetic securities).
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banks were nevertheless encouraged to engage in excessive risk-taking activity. The
regulatory veto existed before the Savings and Loan Crisis and before the financial
crisis, and yet it was not effective at limiting excessive bank activities. Why did the
regulatory veto, which we think is the best approach to banking regulation, fail?
As we develop in this section, the reason why is twofold. First, the structure o f
the regulatory veto encourages ultimatum-type behavior on the part o f banks; for
example, a bank may seek to become too big to shut down or otherwise plan such
that any shutdown will be excessively costly. Second, the incentives o f regulators are
wrong: being constrained to maximize ex post social welfare means that the regulator
will find it difficult to make credible threats to shut down even a bank that provides
no (or even negative) social value.
To develop the intuition, we start with a not-unrealistic hypothetical. Bank I
operates under a regulatory veto regime in which the regulator acts to maximize so
cial welfare. Knowing that the regulator acts only after the bank assembles a portfolio
o f loans and other investments, Bank 1 assembles an aggressive portfolio o f loan
assets and liabilities. Bank I then presents this portfolio to the regulator for inspec
tion. While the portfolio is much more aggressive than the regulator would prefer,
the loans have already been made and the liabilities have already been incurred. The
loans may even be profitable to the bank, which is powerful (albeit erroneous) evi
dence o f their social value.162 In effect. Bank 1 is daring the regulator to shut it down.
The regulator’s choice, therefore, is a starkly limited one: the regulator will shut
down the bank (or the particular banking activity) if, and only if, society is made
better o ff by shutting down the bank (or the activity). So long as Bank I presents a
portfolio o f investments with non-negative social value, it will be extremely difficult
for regulators to shut it down.
A simple example shows why. If Bank l ’s loan portfolio has an expected profit
to Bank l ’s stakeholders o f $10 and an expected cost (borne by counterparties and
society) o f $9, the regulator maximizes social welfare by refraining from shutdown.
Social welfare in that case is $1, whereas it would be $0 in the event o f shutdown.
The optimal amount o f bank activity might be strictly less than that which generates
$10 for Bank 1, but obtaining this maximum may be difficult since the bank, as first
mover and the bundler o f investment projects, can control the portfolio o f invest
ments presented to the regulator.
In fact, Bank 1 could push things further, imposing costs on society o f $9.99, such
that social welfare is virtually a wash. Even in this case, the regulator will not veto
the activity, since doing so would not increase social welfare. In fact, if the costs of
shutdown are positive, then Bank 1 can present a portfolio o f activities that have a
social welfare o f zero (or even negative, up to the costs o f shutdown) and still have
regulators forebear from shutting down the bank.
A simple picture o f this dynamic is shown in Figure 3. As in our model, expected
bank profits are increasing in bank activity levels, although the marginal benefit is
decreasing beyond a certain point. Importantly for setting the optimal regulatory

162. Bank examination manuals explicitly instruct examiners not to be distracted by bank
profits, but examiners of failed banks and thrifts commonly cited bank profitability as an ex
cuse for regulatory forbearance. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1024-25
(citing the example of WaMu).
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policy, this point will be different for each bank. Expected social costs o f bank
activities are also increasing, but unlike firm profits, the m arginal social cost is
constantly increasing in activity le v els.'63 Sim ilarly, the social costs are likely
different for each bank or each activity. In this case, the optim al am ount o f bank
activity (that is, the social w elfare m axim um ) is w here the sum o f the tw o curves is
at a m axim um — this is show n as point A on Figure 3. This is the regulatory sw eet
spot, and the point w here all regulatory reform s are trying to reach. Ex ante
regulations are trying to estim ate it; ex post attem pts w ould be about discouraging
banks from m issing it. But, in light o f the ultim atum gam e dynam ic, a bank can
increase its profitability (but not social w elfare) by m oving up the profit curve to
point B, w here its profits are at a m axim um . It will do so, o f course, only if it believes
that the regulators will not shut down the activity. The regulator is in effect
indifferent betw een points B and C on the curve, since in both cases the social w elfare
is zero. If shut down is costly (as it certainly is, along m any dim ensions), then
regulators will not act to m ove to point C, despite the fact that social w elfare could
be increased (at the expense o f bank profits) by m oving dow n the profit curve to
point A.

Met social
welfare - 0

Social
optimum

Net social
welfare = 0

Activity level (a)

Figure 3. Model o f bank profits and social costs.

163. If this were not the case, the social optimum would be one bank of incredibly large size.
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This kind of behavioral dynamic was evident in the failure of WaMu, which
serviced nearly $125 billion in home loans and had over $200 billion in deposits prior
to its collapse in 2008.164 Five years before it collapsed, examiners reported “signifi
cant deficiencies in WaMu’s underwriting process for residential loans, its core loan
activity.” 165 But regulators brought no enforcement actions against WaMu, despite
the fact that the problems persisted and even worsened. Examiners knew about
WaMu’s activities, they documented the excessive risk and lax controls, and were
troubled by the amount of risk it was taking.166 But they did nothing. When examiners
were asked by an inspector general why they did not take action to shut down
WaMu’s excessively risky activities, examiners responded, “even though under
writing and risk management practices were less than satisfactory, WaMu was mak
ing money and loans were performing.” 157 WaMu, in effect, presented its regulators
with an ultimatum: to condone their aggressive activity level, which was making
large profits but at diminishing or negative amounts of social value, or shut down the
bank. WaMu chose point B instead of point A and effectively dared the regulators to
shut them down.
The key weapon WaMu apparently deployed was the fact that its loans were
profitable. Bank profits may be a particularly powerful weapon in an argument about
shut down, since they may—to the uninformed— suggest social value. Regulators’
higher ups specifically informed bank examiners that “it is not sufficient to demon
strate that the loans are profitable or that the |bank] has not experienced significant
losses in the near term.” 168 This is because in theory bank regulators are aware that
social welfare and bank profits are not the same, as seen clearly on Figure 3. But it
may be much more difficult politically to shut down a profitable bank than an un
profitable one. This may be true as a matter of political rhetoric, as the history of
banking regulation shows frequent and disastrous involvement by politicians in the
regulation of specific banks.169
But it may also be true as a matter of existing law. Banking law statutes generally
limit regulators’ ability to shut down an entire bank to cases where the bank is “in
solvent.” 170 Although it is widely accepted that bank regulators have “wide latitude
to define insolvency,” 17' this restriction may be unnecessarily hamstringing regula
tors into believing they have few options in the face of bank profits. This simply
makes the dynamics of the ultimatum game worse than they would be if the regula
tors have more flexibility to shut down entire banks. We will return to this issue
below in Part III where we discuss potential reforms.
We return now to our simple model of bank behavior to illustrate explicitly these
benefits and drawbacks of the regulatory veto. As before, the bank chooses how
many projects it undertakes, starting with the profitable ones and moving on to those

164. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1025; see also WaMij Report, supra note 11, at 15.
165. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1025.
166. See W a M u Report, supra note 11, at 15-34.
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id. (citing guidance from WaMu’s bank regulator, the Office o f Thrift Supervision).
169. For a discussion o f how political influence impacted regulatory action during the S&L
Crisis, see Epstein & Henderson, supra note 50, at 515-17, 536-39.
170. See FD1C Report, supra note 13, at 457.
171. Id
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that do nothing but increase risk. Instead of imposing ex ante limits on the bank, the
regulator waits for the bank to act; while waiting, the regulator observes a signal of
the firm's expected production and the expected systemic cost R (a), where, for
concreteness, a = 21 + h. After observing these signals, the regulator can either allow
the firm to continue, getting the expected benefits of production and incurring
expected systemic costs, or the regulator can shut down the firm, forcing a liquidation
that yields d + e - C, where C is the cost of liquidation and, as before, d + e is the
capital investment of debt and equity holders. In other words, a shutdown and
liquidation is able to recover the initial capital investment, but at some significant cost.
a. Perfect Information Case
For simplicity, we start with the case where there are no agency costs,
shareholders have perfect information, and the regulator’s subsequent signal is
perfectly revealing. Reasoning by backward induction, shareholders will choose the
maximum level o f activity that does not lead the regulator to shut down the firm or
the activity. Shareholders know that the social welfare-maximizing regulator will
shut down the firm or the activity if and only if the sum of the expected payoffs to
equity, debt, and society, plus the cost of shutdown, exceeds zero. With this in mind,
shareholders choose the level of activity that leads to the regulator being indifferent
to the bank’s continuing. Formally, shareholders choose h and / such that

Yii-l,hnini ~ R(.a) = ~C.
The good part of this approach is that all profitable projects are undertaken and
the firm limits its overall risk to an ex post acceptable level. The drawback of this
approach is that, because of the ultimatum-game dynamic with the regulator, the
overall benefit created by banking is actually negative: it is -C , to be specific. Society
would be better off without it. This is so even when we assume that the regulator
receives perfect information with regard to risk, profitability, and social cost. The
problem becomes worse if we imagine that shareholders have the ability to affect the
cost o f liquidation, C. As C grows larger, so too does the level o f risk that
shareholders will choose, and social welfare decreases in a one-to-one
correspondence.
There are many ways to increase C, and we should expect banks, all else being
equal, to utilize them to increase the chances that it can maximize its own profits.
For instance, banks will tend toward complex transactions that are difficult to
understand and unwind. In addition, banks will increase interconnectivity with other
banks, which makes shutdown of particular activities more difficult and costly. They
will also use separate legal entities, such as subsidiaries and special-purpose vehicles,
especially ones outside of the jurisdictional reach—either physically or statutorily
—of particular regulators, so that corporate fictions will make shutdown messier.
Capturing regulators— either explicitly or implicitly through persuasion— is another
mechanism for increasing the costs of shutdown. It is more difficult to hurt
individuals that one knows, likes, and works with on a regular basis. Deploying
politicians to give regulators a hard time, such as with hearings on Capitol Hill, is
another tried and true mechanism. Finally, we should expect banks to certainly take
no ex ante steps to ease subsequent liquidation, as is supposed to be the case with so-
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called living wills,172 since this simply lowers the costs of shut down, and therefore
decreases expected bank profits in expectation.
b. Imperfect Information Case
In the case where the bank and regulators have imperfect information, the social
welfare may actually be higher than when information is perfect. This is so because
the bank is less sure of the regulator's signal and would not wish to risk complete
shutdown and loss of all profits. In this case, the bank may err on the side of less
profit, and, as it moves down the profit curve toward point A in Figure 3, increasing
social welfare. More formally, suppose that the regulator observes the amount
Y,i=i,hnini ~
or|ly will1 precision of plus or minus $1, relative to the firm’s
signal. There will then be cases in which it behooves the firm to set a portfolio of
activities such that Y,i=i,hnini ~ R(a) = $1. which represents an increase in social
welfare of $1 over the perfect information case. This is not to say, however, that less
information is necessarily good; one could imagine the extreme case where the
regulator’s signal is so uninformative that it then behooves the bank’s shareholders
to maximize both activity level and risk (although, ex ante, they may be less willing
to invest in banking firms).
* * *

At this point, we have largely set out to do the work we intended to do. We have
shown, with some simple intuition and a more formal model, that the extant and
proposed mechanisms for optimizing bank risk taking are insufficient to accomplish
this task. We have shown why regulators can do better by avoiding ex ante regula
tion, and waiting until they have both a signal as to the value of bank activities to the
bank and its customers, and a signal about the social costs of bank activities. But we
have also pointed out a fundamental flaw in the regulatory veto approach. Although
we leave it to others and other work to propose better fixes to the banking regulatory
system, in the next Part we briefly offer some thought starters on potential ways to
improve banking regulation.
III.

HowTo M a k e

B a n k in g R e g u l a t io n B e t t e r

As should be clear at this point, we are not optimistic that any form of ex ante or
ex post regulation alone is going to help achieve the optimal amount of bank activity
levels. The current reforms miss out on an important insight: the benefits of
information acquisition and processing are increasing in time, which suggests there
is benefit of delaying regulation, while the costs arising from judgment proofness are
also increasing in time—which suggests there is benefit in accelerating regulation.
Regulatory action is optimal where the tradeoff between these is at its maximum,
suggesting the best approach is to improve the operation of the regulatory veto rather
than to focus on either ex ante or ex post controls. Improving the dynamic between

172. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, “Living Wills "for Too-Big-To-Fail
Banks Are Released, N.Y. T imes (July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04
/business/living-wills-of-how-tD-unwind-big-banks-arc-tvleased.html | https://pemia.cc/R K117-RINK |.
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bank and regulator— as it involves the on-site examination and regulators ability to
fine tune bank activities— is where regulatory reform can have the best effect.
Fred T ung and one o f the authors o f this Article have offered two ideas for giving
regulators better incentives to get tough with banks, to disregard bank profits in the
face o f socially inefficient risk, and to try to march banks down their profit curve
toward point A in Figure 3. First, they proposed paying examiners for
“performance,” defined as optimizing bank regulation toward point A .173 Although
this proposal suffers from the problems around designing an optimal compensation
package for bank executives discussed above, the idea o f trying to develop a
compensation scheme that encourages regulators to act where they currently forebear
is consistent with what we have said here. One can simply think o f incentive pay for
examiners as a mechanism for overcoming the costs o f shutdown (noted as C in the
discussion above).
Second, they proposed an auction mechanism for allocating examiners to
particular banks as a way o f ensuring better fit, o f encouraging greater production of
information about bank quality and risk, and o f combating regulatory capture.174
Again, this proposal is consistent with our argument, in that it is about reducing the
costs o f regulatory action, encouraging better accountability on the part o f regulators,
and improving examiner quality and work.
There are other possibilities, which we will only mention here. In general, our model
suggests the best reforms are the ones that focus on reducing the costs o f regulatory
action (that is, reducing C), as the Henderson and Tung proposals try to do.
One o f these m ight be the requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act that the largest 100
financial institutions (that is, those with greater than $250 billion in assets) submit
“ living wills” to bank regulators to assist the regulators in winding down the banks
in the event o f a failure.175 In theory, such living wills could help lower the regulatory
shut down cost for an activity or an entire bank. This could lead to more regulatory
action in the form o f the regulatory veto, and this might move us closer to the
regulatory sweet spot. In addition, as noted above,176 banks do not have incentives to
make the costs o f their shutdown lower, and therefore a regulatory requirement to do
so may make sense.
There are problems with the rule as it now stands. First, much o f the information
contained in the first batch o f living wills was repetitive o f information about banks
already publicly available.177 Bank regulators already know this information— plus
much more— so packaging only publicly available information in a new form is
unlikely to add much value. Second, as currently formulated, such living wills are

173. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1027-31.
174. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 106.
175. Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires certain large financial institu
tions to prepare and update plans for orderly resolution of their balance sheets in the event of
a threatened or actual collapse of the firm. 1'he rules arc promulgated as Regulation QQ for
the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 243 (2016), and Part 381 for the FD1C, 12 C.F.R.
ij 381 (2016). For a list of and access to resolution plans required under the law, see Resolution
Plans, F ed. Res . Board, http://www.federalreservc.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm
[https://perma.cc/YE29-UNGMI (last updated Dec. 13, 2016).
176. See supra Part 1.
177. Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra note 172.
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designed to be deployed only in extreme circumstances, such as the rapid and
unexpected failure of an entire bank.178 This is much less useful in terms of our model
than a more general playbook on how to shut down specific bank activities, both as
a stand-alone matter and in combination. For obvious reasons, banks will not
voluntarily provide this information, especially if it is made public. Our analysis
suggests that it would be valuable for regulators to have much greater transparency
and a road map to reduce the costs of shutting down bank activities (in our model,
lowering C). This is not the current approach.
Another possibility is the use of a device through which regulators precommit to
take a regulatory action in the event of certain eventualities. In other words,
regulators would remove some of the discretion from the examination process, so as
to signal to banks that the costs of regulatory action are low, and therefore try to alter
the incentives in the regulatory ultimatium game that is currently played. If banks
believe regulators will exercise the regulatory veto in certain circumstances, then
when they move first they will be reluctant to generate those circumstances. Of
course, predicting the optimal circumstances in which to exercise the veto is a
difficult challenge, since this falls into the ex ante bucket of regulation, and therefore
is subject to the criticisms we have outlined above. But the virtue of combining an
ex ante precommitment device with the regulatory veto is that it allows the regulators
to observe costs and benefits, and only shut down those activities that, in practice,
result in suboptimal levels of bank activity or care.
An analogy to this regulatory approach are the so-called “prompt corrective
action” rules (PCA).170 These rules remove regulator discretion to act when certain
triggers are met. They were put in place in the wake of the S&L Crisis after the
evidence that politicians influenced regulators to forebear from taking action that
would have reduced losses.180 For instance, if bank leverage ratios fall below pre
scribed levels, regulators have no choice but to a c t, among other things, to force the
bank to raise additional capital. This approach could be expanded to include not only
compliance with leverage limits, but also to encourage optimal bank activity levels.
Regulatory higher ups could estimate the optimal number of regulatory curtailments
based on historical practice, prevailing bank practices, and macroeconomic
conditions. A target could be set, with an algorithm for determining whether
regulatory action is warranted in a particular case. The key insight of the PCA model
is that regulators may be unable to act when it is optimal for them to act. In the PCA
case, the disease was meddling by politicians who were beholden to bankers. In this
case, it is regulators subjected to an ultimatum game in which bankers can force
regulators into a rational but suboptimal regulatory choice.
C o nclusio n

Banking regulation has repeatedly failed, most recently in the run up to the
financial crisis. The solutions offered for the latest failures largely fall into traditional
categories: ex post remedies (following from tort law) and ex ante prophylaxes

178. Id.
179. 12 U.S.C. ij 1831 o (2012).
180. See Epstein & Henderson, supra note 50. at 516-17.
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(following from command-and-control regulations, like in environmental law). Pro
posals to change banker incentives through mandatory forms of compensation, to
limit the size of banks, and to require additional capital all fall into these categories.
While individual reforms might be somewhat helpful, especially in combination, our
analysis shows the fundamental weakness of relying solely on ex ante or ex post
forms of regulation.
Ex ante regulations put burdens on regulators that are too high in terms of
information and knowledge relative to the case where the same regulatory decisions
would be made later in time. Regulators deciding on the optimal amount o f bank
activity or bank care simply do not have all the information they will need to make
the best regulatory decision they can make. It might be better to wait. If regulators
can learn about the private and social benefits and costs of particular bank activities
by watching them in practice, then there are gains from regulatory delay. As we
show, this is especially true in modern finance, where there are heterogeneous firms,
products, and consumers. In this case, an ex ante, one-size-fits-all approach will overand underdeter conduct. In short, ex ante regulation might be sensible where
expected harms are large, innovation is uncommon, and regulatory arbitrage is
costly, but banking is (increasingly) an area in which, while expected harms may be
large, there is a tremendous amount of innovation, and the ability to arbitrate
regulations is extremely easy.
Delaying too much, however, may result in a lost opportunity for any effective
regulation. While ex post litigation (or insurance) might be effective in producing
optimal incentives for most consumer products and services, the nature of systemic
risk means that for banks there are significant judgment-proofness problems, espe
cially if defaults are highly correlated across the financial sector. If excessive bank
activity is only revealed when banks fail, then tort liability does little good, especially
with the presence of limited liability and implicit and explicit government guaran
tees. In such cases, the tort literature suggests insurance (or bonding) is efficient, but
if the default risk of insurance companies is correlated with bank systemic risk, as
appears to be somewhat true from recent experience, then ex post insurance will be
insufficient to optimize bank risk taking.
It is for these reasons that we think bank regulation has historically involved
another, more unique form of regulation, which we call the regulatory veto. Regula
tors who work at specific banks full-time observe the banks’ activities and are
empowered to require a change in the activity level or care a particular bank takes.
The logic is to try to optimize the tradeoff between information production and analy
sis by the regulators—which is increasing over time—and the efficacy of any regula
tory action— which is decreasing over time. The regulatory veto is designed to find
this point, which is likely to vary by bank, by financial product, and depends heavily
on the prevailing economic circumstances.
Unfortunately, we show how the current design of the regulatory veto is unlikely
to result in its effective use. Because banks act first, they can present a socially ineffi
cient portfolio of bank activities to regulators who cannot improve social welfare by
shutting down the activities. In other words, the current regulatory veto is inherently
flawed by an ultimatum-game dynamic in which regulators rationally act in ways
that destroy social welfare. It follows that banks will engage in practices, like opacity,
complexity, and regulatory capture, that are designed to influence this process.
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We do not offer a complete solution for this problem, leaving that to others or
other work. But our analysis does suggest that the reforms most likely to be effective
at optimizing bank activity levels are ones designed to increase the ability of regula
tors to precommit to take regulatory action in the face of evidence of excessive bank
risk taking.
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